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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Institutional Change 
Kathleen M. Sheehan 
This dissertation consists of three essays which empirically investigate different avenues of 
institutional change. The introduction opens with a discussion of the topics explored in the three 
essays and provides an overview of important results from each essay. Essay one is a joint effort 
with Dr. Andrew Young. In this essay, we examine how foreign aid affects institutional change 
using a panel of aid recipient countries and multiple measures of institutions. In essay two, I 
examine how globalization affects informal institutions, measured by the level of culture in a 
country. The final essay explores if there are spatial spillovers from institutions in the European 
Union. The final chapter summarizes the conclusions of the three essays and discusses some 
possibilities for further investigation.  
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It is widely accepted that the institutional quality of a country affects its economic development 
(see Hall and Jones (1999), Sturm and De Haan (2001), Rodrick et al. (2004), and Seldadyo et al. 
(2007)). While recent studies have highlighted the importance of institutions for economic growth, 
the mechanisms that shape these vital institutions are less understood. Since institutions are 
important for the economic growth of a country, it is important to better understand how a country 
forms its institutions and how they evolve over time. In the following essays, I empirically 
investigate different mechanisms that may affect institutional quality.  
 My first essay, “Foreign Aid, Institutional Quality, and Growth”, is a joint effort with Dr. 
Andrew Young. Using a panel of up to 135 countries from 1970-2005 we estimate the effects of 
foreign aid flows on a variety of measures of institutional quality. We find that aid flows are 
associated with the deterioration of both political and economic institutions. Regarding the latter, 
aid flows are associated with deterioration in a recipient’s legal system and property rights, all well 
as its openness to international trade. Controlling for both political and economic institutions in 
growth regressions, the latter robustly and positively associated with growth. After controlling for 
institutional quality, aid flows are not otherwise significantly related to growth.  
In my second essay, I examine how globalization impacts culture. Many believe that 
globalization can lead to cultural change within a society, but how globalization impacts culture is 
not well understood. In this paper I empirically investigate how globalization affects economic 
culture. The KOF globalization index is employed as a measure of globalization while a measure 
of culture is constructed from European Value and World Value Surveys data. The constructed 
measure emphasizes cultural dimensions that have been shown to positively correlate with 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. Based on a panel of data for 91 countries covering 1970-
2005 I report that globalization is positively related to this measure of culture. Furthermore, the 
economic and social (rather than the political) dimensions of globalization appear to drive the 
estimated relationship.  
My final essay looks to see if there are institutional spillover effects. Institutional quality in 
one country is likely affected by the economic environment and institutional quality in neighboring 




employing spatial econometric techniques. Because a country’s neighbors may affect their 
institutional quality by a variety of avenues, I use a Spatial Durbin maximum likelihood model.  I 
find that the Economic Freedom of the World measure of institutions shows positive institutional 
spillovers as well as the components that measure access to sound money, the freedom to trade 
internationally, and the regulations of credit, labor and business.  For these measures of 
institutions, a country’s institutions directly affect the institutional quality of their neighboring 
countries’ institutions.  The Worldwide Governance Indicator rule of law and the institutional 
measures by Freedom House also show positive institutional spillovers. The presence or absence of 
institutional spillovers will help in better understanding how institutions evolve overtime.   





Chapter 1:  
Foreign Aid, Institutional Quality, and Growth 
1. Introduction 
Institutional quality is an essential ingredient for economic growth. As Rodrick et al. (2004) 
famously proclaimed: institutions rule. And while foreign aid is aimed at promoting growth and 
prosperity in developing nations, some researchers have argued that its effectiveness is a function 
of institutional quality (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000 & 2004). Recent evidence that aid flows 
are detrimental to institutions is therefore doubly troubling (Svensson (2000), Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007), Heckelman and Knack (2008), and Djankov et al. (2008)). Aid may harm the 
very institutions under which it can be effective: the same institutions that themselves promote 
economic growth.  
There are plausible reasons why aid flows might be detrimental to a recipient’s institutional 
quality. For example, a government receiving aid is less reliant on the collection of tax revenues. It 
may therefore be less responsive and accountable to its citizens. Aid flows are also windfalls that 
are disbursed through specific channels. The rewards to controlling the channels (rent-seeking) 
may be high relative to the rewards from productive activities (Baumol, 1990). Like the flow of 
rents from a subterranean natural resource, aid may “curse” a country by exerting a corrupting 
influence on its institutions (Djankov et al., 2008).
1
  
 In this paper we investigate the links between foreign aid, institutional quality, and 
growth. Up until now there have been three fairly distinct literatures on the effects of (i) aid on 
growth, (ii) institutions on growth, and (iii) aid on institutions. One of our contributions is to 
explore (i), (ii), and (iii) together with a single panel composed of data from up to 116 countries 
and covering the years 1970 through 2010. Another of our contributions is to tie these separate 
literatures together, asking which (if any) dimensions of institutional quality are likely channels 
through which aid affects growth.  
Specifically, we ask which dimensions of institutional quality (e.g., economic versus 
political freedoms) are significantly affected by aid flows. Those affected dimensions are potential 
                                                 





channels through which aid affects growth. We then estimate growth regressions including all of 
the affected dimensions to determine which represent likely indirect channels for aid to affect 
growth. In doing so, we control for the direct effect of aid on growth. This last step acknowledges 
that there are certainly other channels through which aid affects growth (e.g., through increasing 
the resources available for investments). 
Our analysis includes a large number of institutional quality measures, including Polity IV 
scores, the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index from the Fraser Institute, the checks and 
balances measure from Keefer and Stasavage (2003), and both the political rights and civil liberties 
measures from Freedom House. Besides including a larger number of institutional variables than 
previous studies, we also break the EFW into its five constituent components, separating the effects 
of aid on, e.g., the legal environment and property rights versus the size of government. This gives 
us a finer picture of which economic institutions are affected by aid flows. Given this large number 
of measures of political and economic institutions, our study is unique in analyzing the effects of 
all of them using a uniform identification strategy. 
We find that aid flows are associated with decreases in measures of both political and 
economic institutions. Relative to the sample variation in our institutional measures, the effect on 
economic institutions is larger. Controlling for all of the affected measures, only decreases in 
economic institutions are significantly associated with lower rates of economic growth. Discerning 
from the data which specific dimensions of economic institutional quality matter most is difficult. 
However, the strongest evidence points towards deteriorations in international trade freedoms 
being a channel through which aid affects growth.  
This paper is organized as follows. A review of the relevant literature and an explanation of 
how our paper contributes are contained in section 2. Section 3 contains a description of our data 
and econometric strategy. Our empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4. 
Concluding comments constitute section 5. 
2. Existing Literature and the Present Paper 
There is a substantial literature addressing the effect of foreign aid on economic growth. The 
conclusions of individual researchers are varied. Our reading of the literature suggests that a 




only in good policy environments; at worst it is detrimental to a recipient’s development. Our 
reading of the literature, however, will undoubtedly be controversial. As Rajan (2005) concluded: 
“the debate about aid effectiveness is one where little is settled.”
2
 
 In the 1970s Peter Bauer (1972) was a relatively lone voice among economists in 
questioning the effectiveness of foreign aid. Inspired by Bauer’s work, however, Boone (1996) 
provided a seminal econometric study reporting that aid is not associated with higher growth or 
investment in developing countries. This pessimistic view of aid was tempered by the later 
research of Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) who found that, while aid has little impact on growth 
on average, it does have a positive impact on growth conditional on a good policy environment. 
Subsequent studies by Collier and Dehn (2001), Collier and Dollar (2002, 2004), and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) reported similar results. 
The Burnside and Dollar research proved remarkably influential in the development 
community but not uncontroversial. Easterly (2003) and Easterly et al. (2004) argued that the 
Burnside and Dollar results are sensitive to small changes in the time period and countries 
included. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) is another recent study that failed to find a positive effect 
of aid even in good policy environments. Worse yet, Barro and Lee (2005) actually found the 
effect of aid on growth to be negative. However, other researchers are more sanguine about the 
potential for aid to foster growth. Influential papers by Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) found that 
aid increases growth in recipient countries and that this positive effect is not conditional on a good 
policy environment.
3
 Dalgaard et al. (2004) and Karras (2006) reported similar results.
4
  
 A large literature also addresses the effect of institutions on economic growth. Inspired by 
the seminal work of North and Thomas (1973) and North (1990), these studies relate differences in 
                                                 
2 Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009,2011) conducted meta-analyses of, respectively, 100 and 68 papers examining the effect of 
aid on growth. In both meta-analyses they conclude that the effect of aid on growth is not statistically significant. Bjørnskov 
(2013) is a recent and novel attempt to use factor analysis to break aid down into different types according to its intended 
purposes: (i) economic, (ii) social, (iii) reconstruction, and then (iv) a residual type. He reports that only (iii) has significantly 
positive effects on growth. 
3 Hansen and Tarp reported that the effect of aid in growth regressions disappears when human and physical capital investments are 
included as controls. However, they also found that aid positively affects investment. According to Hansen and Tarp, then, 
investment is the likely channel through which aid fosters economic growth. 
4 Bjerg at al. (2011) present evidence from 38 least developed countries (LDCs) that aid does not generally foster growth, but may be 




growth rates across countries to “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North, 1990, p. 3). Such constraints include, but are not limited to, private property rights and 
regulatory structure (economic freedoms) and the structure of elections and systems of checks and 
balances in a government (political freedoms). While Rodrick et al.’s (2004) assertion that 
institutions rule is not uncontroversial, nearly all students of development recognize the critical 
role of institutional quality in growth outcomes.
5
  
 Several early cross-country studies found that strong private property rights are associated 
with higher income per capita levels (Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)). Barro (1996) analyzed a broader set of institutions, including 
economic freedom, rule-of-law, and democracy, and found that the first two are significantly, 
positively related to growth.
6
 Rodrick et al. (2004) reported that measures of the rule of law and 
property rights contribute to economic growth and, furthermore, once they are controlled for 
geography variables play an insignificant role in growth determination. Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005), using an identification strategy based on exogenous variation in institutional quality from 
colonial times, also reported that changes in the strength of property rights are associated with 
large changes in a country’s rates of investment and economic growth. 
 The question of whether aid impacts a recipient’s institutions has only caught the attention 
of researchers recently. That this question came to the fore is unsurprising given the positive 
relationship between institutional quality and growth on the one hand, and the relative paucity of 
evidence for a positive correlation between aid and growth on the other. Being a relatively new 
literature it has as of yet produced few widely-accepted conclusions. 
 In an early and influential paper Svensson (2000) provides a game theoretic model of rent-
seeking activities focused on foreign aid flows. In the model, aid is a common-pool resource that 
can be either be allocated towards public goods investment or appropriated for private 
consumption. He called attention to how efforts by agents in recipient countries to appropriate aid 
                                                 
5 The chief alternative offered to the primacy of institutions in growth determination is geography. See Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs 
(2003). Glaeser et al. (2004) have also argued that, while institutions are important, human capital is a more fundamental source of 
economic growth. 
6 Barro found the overall relationship between growth and democracy to be weakly negative. However, he also found some evidence 
that the relationship is non-linear. In particular, starting from low levels, increases in democracy are good for growth; but the 




could both be wasteful (redundant) and costly in terms of the forgone productive activities. 
Hoddler (2007) and Economides et al. (2008) incorporate similar rent-seeking games into Barro 
(1990)-type endogenous growth models. While aid may have a positive direct effect on growth 
through providing funds to finance public goods, an offsetting (and perhaps larger) indirect effect 
is associated with the allocation of resources towards rent-seeking. Moving beyond the models, if 
foreign aid flows promote rent-seeking, then over time the institutions of recipient countries are 
likely to become geared towards such unproductive activities.  
 Svensson (2000) reports evidence that, due to increases in rent seeking activity, foreign aid 
is associated with higher corruption levels. Using the International Country Risk Guide as a 
measure of institutional quality, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) found that aid flows reduce the 
quality of institutions and governance in developing countries. While foreign aid has often been 
used to promote democracy, Djankov et al. (2008) found that higher levels of foreign aid actually 
harm a recipient’s political institutions.
7
 Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) also find that aid recipients 
are less likely to experience democratic reforms (though they find the effect to be mitigated if 
economic reforms are precede the aid). Heckelman and Knack (2008) considered aid's impact on 
economic institutions and found that it hinders (rather than encourages) market-oriented reform. 
Powell and Ryan (2006) found similar results. However, in a later paper Heckelman and Knack 
(2009) concluded that aid had no significant effect on economic institutions.  
In this paper we employ the empirical framework and dynamic panel data techniques that 
are employed in Djankov et al. (2008) to estimate the effect of aid flows on institutional quality. 
However, while Djankov et al. (2008) use (1) the Polity IV democracy score and (2) the Keefer 
and Stasavage (2002, 2003) checks and balances measure, we expand their analysis to several 
other measures of institutional quality: (3) the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) score and 
(4) its five component area scores; as well as the Freedom House measures of (5) political rights 
and (6) civil liberties. As in Djankov et al. (2008) we address the potential endogeneity of aid using 
instrumental variables GMM estimation. Since the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected 
when considering a large number of institutional measures, our identification strategy allows for 
                                                 








Not only can our paper be viewed as an extension of the Djankov et al. (2008) study to 
include a considerably larger number of dimensions of institutional quality and a longer time 
period. It is also an improvement upon the existing studies of aid’s effect on economic institutions. 
Our study includes a larger data set than Heckelman and Knack (2008). Rather than 10 or 20 year 
cross-sections we examine a true panel including 8 five year periods. We are also able to examine a 
greater number of countries with EFW scores: 88 rather than 73. 
Lastly, the existing literature on aid’s effect on institutional quality stops short of formally 
“connecting the dots” to the literatures on how aid and institutional quality, respectively, affect 
economic growth. We contribute by bridging this gap. Having identified the dimensions of 
institutional quality that are affected by aid, we employ the same data and methods to estimate 
growth regressions including all of those identified institutional variables as controls. The results 
highlight the institutional channels through which aid likely affects growth. Furthermore, we check 
the robustness of these channels to including aid independently as a control. In addition to a 
robustness check, the estimated coefficient on aid indicates whether aid affects growth through 
channels other than institutional quality, and whether the effect through those channels is positive 
or negative. 
3. Data 
We use official development assistance (ODA) data as our measure of the amount of foreign aid a 
country receives. ODA is constituted by grants and loans given to a recipient country during a 
given year. ODA data is converted into 2005 dollars using the World Import Unit Value Index 
from the IMF and then taken as a share of a recipients real GDP. GDP data is gathered from the 
Penn World Table Version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013).  
While the ODA share of GDP is our variable of primary interest, in some specifications we 
consider (log of) ODA per capita as an alternative. However, unless we explicitly refer to “ODA 
                                                 
8 Validity is the null hypothesis in tests of overidentifying restrictions, so any identification strategy must still be intuitively 




per capita”, when we refer to the variable “ODA” below we will be referring to the aid share of a 
recipient’s GDP. 
 We relate average aid flows (as a share of GDP) over five year periods to the changes in 
institutional variables over those same periods. These variables are proxies for various economic 
and political institutions that are often thought to be correlated with growth experiences. They are 
(1) the Polity IV democracy scores; (2) the checks and balances measure from Keefer and 
Stasavage (2003); (3) the Economic Freedom of the World index from the Fraser Institute and (4) 




 The Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggars, 2010) scores the level of democracy 
(DEMOC) in a country with a particular emphasis on executive recruitment and constraints and the 
level of political competition. Polity IV uses a scale of zero to 10, with 10 representing a fully 
institutionalized democracy. Keefer and Stasavage (2002, 2003) utilize an alternative measure of 
political institutions based on indicators from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et 
al., 2010). Their checks and balances (CHECKS) variable is based on the number of “veto players” 
that exist in a country’s political system. Veto players are decision-makers whose agreement is 
required for policy changes to occur. A higher CHECKS score corresponds to greater restraint on 
government; to a higher level of consensus necessary for policies to be changed. In our sample 
there are 135 countries for which we have observations on the change in CHECKS with 
corresponding ODA data.  
 The Economic Freedom of the World (FREEDOM) index measures how supportive a 
country’s institutions are to economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2013). Therefore, it represents a 
gauge of a country’s economic institutions. Numerous studies have documented a positive link 
between this economic freedom measure and economic growth (e.g., Ayal and Karras (1998), 
Dawson (1998), Gwartney et al. (1999), de Haan and Sturm (2000), Gwartney et al. (2006), and 
                                                 
9 Some studies (e.g., Karras (2006)) focus on aid per capita. Though aid as a percent of GDP is a more common measure, we check 
the robustness of our main 2SLS results (analogous to those of table 3 below) to using aid per capita instead. The point estimates 
are qualitatively similar but not statistically significant. As it turns out, our instrumental variables are weak for ODA per capita. 




Heckelman and Stroup (2000)).
10
 The overall index is the sum of five constituent area scores: size 
of government (SIZE_GOV), legal structure and property rights (PROP_RIGHTS), access to 
sound money (MONEY), freedom to trade internationally (TRADE), and regulations of credit, 
labor, and business (REGULATION). The comprehensive and area scores are all on a scale from 
zero to 10, with zero being least and 10 being most free.  
 In addition to our three primary institutional measures (DEMOC, CHECKS, and 
FREEDOM) we also employ the political rights (POL_RIGHTS) and civil liberties (CIV_LIBS) 
scores provided by Freedom House. To some extent POL_RIGHTS is a more comprehensive 
measure of political institutions than either DEMOC or CHECKS. A country’s score is based on an 
evaluation of the characteristics of the electoral process, the functioning of the government, and 
political participation and pluralism. CIV_LIBS, alternatively, scores the extent to which the 
government is constrained. It is based on an evaluation of associational and organizational rights, 
freedom of belief and expression, personal autonomy, and the rule of law. Each score is on the 
scale of 1 to 7 where 1 is the most free. (These are the only institutional measures where a lower 
number is “better”.)  
 As additional controls in institutional change regressions we consider oil production as a 
share of a recipient country’s GDP (OIL) and, separately, positive and negative terms of trade 
shocks (SHOCKS_POS and SHOCKS_NEG). These are controls suggested by Djankov et al. 
(2008). Controlling for oil production is motivated by the hypothesis of natural resource curses and 
their effects on institutional quality. Data on oil production and prices are gathered from BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, Historical Data. Oil production is measured in barrels and oil 
prices are given in 2009 dollars which we put into 2005 dollars using the World Import Unit Value 
index. We use oil share in our analysis which is calculated by multiplying oil production with oil 
prices and then dividing by a countries GDP. As terms of trade shock measures, we take mean 
values of, separately, positive and negative growth rates of the terms of trade over the five year 
periods. Terms of trade are the national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price 
index, with 2005 equal to 100. Data is gathered from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
                                                 
10 See de Haan et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature. See Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) for a meta-




Development, Handbook of Statistics and International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics.  
 In addition to the variables suggested by Djankov et al. (2008) we also relate changes in 
institutions to a variety of other variables suggested by the literature. These are: linguistic and 
ethnic fractionalization (LANGUAGE and ETHNIC: Heckelman and Knack (2008), Dreher and 
Rupprecht (2007), and Coviello and Islam (2006)); real per capita GDP growth (RPCGROWTH: 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2011), Heckelman and Knack (2008), Knedlik and Kronthaler (2007), and 
Dreher and Rupprecht (2007)); a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for countries that represent 
donors’ strategic interests (DONORSSI: Ear (2007) and Coviello and Islam (2007)); regional 
dummy variables (Bearce and Tirone (2010) and Coviello and Islam (2007)).  
Measures of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are from the MacroDataGuide and are 
based on Alesina et al. (2003). DONORSSI takes the value of 1 for countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Franc Zone, Egypt, and Central American Countries.
11
 
 Once we have established which of our institutional measures are significantly affected by 
aid flows, we proceed to estimate growth regressions including the levels of those measures. 
Specifically, the growth rate over a five year period is related to the initial level of institutions. We 
include several controls that are standard in growth empirical studies. Based on Penn World Table 
data, we include the investment to GDP ratio, the population growth rate, and the initial level of 
real GDP per capita (to control for conditional convergence effects). Additionally, we use World 
Development Indicator data on primary and secondary school enrollment (to control for human 
capital effects) as well as the urban population share as controls. 
 Summary statistics for all of the above variables are contained in Table 1. This table also 
includes, in brief, a description and source for each data series. 
4. Results 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel of 5 year periods: 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-
1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010. The baseline set of institutional 
                                                 
11 We employ 5 regional dummy variables. These dummies are for (i) Sub-Saharan African countries, (ii) Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, (iii) Middle Eastern and North African countries, (iv) Asian and Pacific countries, and (v) transition (i.e., 




variables is DEMOC, CHECKS, and FREEDOM. The first results that we report are from 
regressions of changes in institutional measures over the five year periods on the average ODA the 
same period. (For example, the value of CHECKS in 1985 minus its 1980 value is regressed on the 
average aid flow as a fraction of GDP from 1980 to 1985.) We also include OIL, SHOCKS_NEG, 
and SHOCKS_POS as controls, as well as LANGUAGE, ETHNIC, RPCGROWTH, DONORSSI, 
and regional dummies. Lastly, all estimations control for the initial level of institutions. 
 Controlling for the initial level of institutions is sensible given that institutions are 
persistent and also that the potential for institutional change is likely a function of the current level 
of institutional quality. The latter will be true, for example, if institutional improvements are 
relatively easy to achieve starting from very poor levels of institutional quality, but are more 
difficult to achieve once institutional quality reaches a higher level. (The dependency of 
institutional change on the current institutional quality level is also sensible given the bounded-
nature of our measures.) Furthermore, controlling for the initial level of institutional quality is 
standard in the literature (e.g., Bearce and Tirone (2010), Heckelman and Knack (2008), Dreher 
and Rupprecht (2008), and Djankov et al. (2008)). 
Consider the following relationship in levels: 
(4.1)   1312;110 
 ttttt XINSTODAINST  , 
where INST is an institutional measure, the dual subscript on ODA indicates the average 
from (t-1) to t, and X is a vector of controls. We can subtract INSTt-1 from both sides of the above 
equation to arrive at our dynamic panel data model, 
(4.2)   
  1312;1101 1   tttttt XINSTODAINSTINST  . 
The model, (4.2), provides us with the prediction that the coefficient on initial institutional 
quality should be negative.  
 From estimations of (4.2) we determine, based on the information in our sample, what 
measures of institutional quality are significantly affected by aid flows, Following that 
determination, we then explore (per capita real GDP) growth regressions that include these affected 





4.1.Aid’s Effect on Institutional Quality  
Table 2 reports OLS regressions based on (4.2) and using the baseline institutional variables and 
controls. In all of the regressions period fixed effects are included. Including period effects makes 
sense because the general level of aid flows may change over time, and not necessarily in a linear 
or even monotonic fashion. For example, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced 
in 2000 were associated with increased aid giving by many countries. Alternatively, Dang et al. 
(2013) report evidence suggesting that periods during which donors experience banking crises are 
associated with substantial decreases in aid. The inclusion of period fixed effects can help to 
control for these sorts of events and their effects on the variation in aid flows over time. 
In the case of DEMOC, the coefficient on ODA is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Based on the point estimate, a standard deviation increase in ODA (0.025) is 
associated with about a 0.213 point increase in DEMOC. This is a small effect. (The sample 
standard deviation of DEMOC is 3.697.) The coefficient estimates in the CHECKS and 
FREEDOM estimations are both smaller and statistically insignificant, though they are also both 
positive. The F-statistics reported in Table 2 suggest that including period fixed effects is 
appropriate, always rejecting their joint insignificance at the 1% level. 
 OLS results are likely to be biased because aid flows are almost certainly endogenous. 
Decisions concerning whether or not to give aid – as well as how much aid to give – are made by 
donors who may take into account the institutional quality of potential recipients. For example, 
Brück and Xu (2012) report that positive regime changes (measured by the Polity IV index) are 
associated with increases in foreign aid. Furthermore, the influential research of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000, 2004) can be interpreted as recommending that donors pay attention to institutional 
quality as a matter of policy. Omitted variables are also a concern. To account for this endogeneity, 
we report the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations that employ initial values of a 
country’s agricultural share of GDP (AG_SHARE) and the life expectancy of its citizens 
(LIFE_EXPECT) as instruments. (When the dependent variable is the change in FREEDOM from 
1980 to 1985, for example, 1980 values of AG_SHARE and LIFE_EXPECT are instruments.) 




 We believe that this identification strategy is plausible. These are variables that are likely 
to be correlated with subsequent aid flows. For example, a lower life expectancy is likely to evoke 
a higher rate of giving from donors. While these variables are also likely to be correlated with the 
level of institutions, we do not immediately suspect them of being determinants of the change in 
institutional quality. This combined with the fact that we use initial values suggests that these 
instruments are likely to be valid. (Since we have two instruments and will be treating only ODA 
as endogenous, we have one testable overidentifying restriction.) These instruments are both used 
in previous work by Heckelman and Knack (2008) to instrument aid. Also when ODA is regressed 
on a constant and these two instruments, each of the instruments enters the regression significantly 
at the 10% level or better. The R
2 
from the regression is 0.179 and the F-statistic from a test of the 
instruments’ joint insignificance is 18.972 (significant at the 1% level).  
These regression results are an informal but perhaps helpful way of demonstrating that the 
instruments are relevant to the endogenous variable, ODA. More formally, we report the first-stage 
F-statistics for the 2SLS estimations that follow.  
 The first three columns of results in Table 3 correspond to 2SLS estimations based on 
specifications analogous to those reported in Table 2. The coefficient estimates on ODA are 
always negative and, in the case of CHECKS and FREEDOM, statistically significant (10% level 
for the former; 1% level for the latter). Using the point estimates, a standard deviation increase in 
ODA is associated with about a 0.376 point decrease in CHECKS, and about a 0.478 point 
decrease in FREEDOM. The estimated effect is larger for economic institutions. In the case of 
FREEDOM, 0.478 amounts to almost 38% of a standard deviation (1.262). To put the estimated 
effect on FREEDOM in perspective, 0.478 of a point is roughly the difference in the 2005 scores 
between the US (8.03) and countries like Cyprus (7.55), Jamaica (7.62), and Panama (7.44).
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 One concern about our results may be that they are based on an unbalanced panel. Balancing the panels for the full 1970-2010 
time period leaves us with only a handful of countries. However, in the appendix we report results analogous to Table 3 based on 
a balanced panel of 48 countries for 5-year periods beginning with 1980-1985 and ending with 2005-2010 (Table 9). (The 
countries in this subsample are contained in Table 8.) The ODA point estimates for DEMOC, CHECKS, and FREEDOM remain 
negative, but the estimate for CHECKS is no longer significant (p-value = 0.194). However, ODA still enters significantly (5% 
level) in the FREEDOM estimation and the point estimate is roughly the same size (-20.690 compared to -19.111 in Table 3). 
(Note that in these estimations we do not include the transition economy dummy variable. No former Soviet-bloc countries 





Regarding the plausibility of the identification strategy that is employed, the first-stage F-
statistics are reported for all three of the Table 3 estimations. In each case they reject joint 
insignificance of the instruments at the 1% level. Also, the J-statistics associated with Sargan tests 
never provide evidence to reject the overidentifying restriction at conventional significance levels.  
Moving from the baseline set of institutional quality measures, Table 4 reports 2SLS 
estimations based on changes in the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores 
(POL_RIGHTS and CIV_LIBS) and the various component areas of the Economic Freedom of the 
World index (SIZE_GOV, PROP_RIGHTS, MONEY, TRADE, and REGULATION). All of these 
estimations include period fixed effects. For compactness, only coefficient estimates on ODA are 
reported along with the first-stage F-statistics and Sargan test J-statistics. The estimated effects of 
ODA on both POL_RIGHTS and CIV_LIBS are both positive but only statistically significant for 
CIV_LIBS. In that case, a standard deviation increase in ODA is associated with about 24% of a 
standard deviation increase in CIV_LIBS. (Note that both Freedom House measures are 
constructed so that a higher score corresponds to fewer political rights or civil liberties.) However, 
this is the one case where the J-statistic indicates rejection of the over-identifying restriction (5% 
level), causing us to doubt that we have identified a meaningful effect.  
Next, we consider the component areas of FREEDOM. Economic freedom is a 
multifaceted concept. If aid flows lead to decreases in economic freedom then along which 
dimensions of freedom do those decreases occur? The two areas where the estimated effects of 
ODA are statistically significant are PROP_RIGHTS and TRADE. Both estimated effects are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. A standard deviation increase in aid flows is 
associated with about a 1.38 point decrease in PROP_RIGHTS and a 0.978 point decrease in 
TRADE. These estimated effects amount to, respectively, about 82% of a standard deviation and 
44% of standard deviation decreases. The estimated effect of aid on the legal system and security 
of property rights is particularly large. Based on 2005 values this is roughly comparable to the 





4.2.Growth Regressions Including Affected Institutional Measures 
 We have established that both political and economic institutions are likely affected by aid 
flows. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that aid’s effect is deleterious. We now return to our 
baseline set of institutional measures (DEMOC, CHECKS, and FREEDOM) and ask whether any 
of these variables significantly enter a growth regression when all three are controlled for. In other 
words, if both types of institutions are negatively affected by aid then is either of them a channel 
through which aid negatively affects economic growth?  
In the case of DEMOC, aid did not enter as a statistically significant determinant (Table 3). 
However, we are still interested to know whether it is a robust correlate with growth. Furthermore, 
in considering CHECKS and FREEDOM as potential channels through which aid affects growth, 
DEMOC is potentially a source of bias if omitted. (The correlations of DEMOC with CHECKS 
and FREEDOM in our sample are, respectively, 0.634 and 0.354.)  
 The dependent variable is per capita real GDP growth over a 5-year period. The initial 
level of DEMOC, CHECKS, and FREEDOM are all included regressors. We also include 
additional controls that are common in the empirical growth literature and suggested by the 
standard neoclassical growth model from which growth regressions are derived (e.g., Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992)). These controls are a country’s investment share if GDP, its population 
growth rate, and its initial level of real GDP per capita. We also control for the urban population 
share and primary and secondary enrollment rates; also ODA is itself a control variable. 
 Table 5 reports the growth regression results. The first column contains OLS results when 
period fixed effects are included in the estimation, and the second column contains results when 
country fixed effects are included. In either case, neither DEMOC nor CHECKS enters 
significantly. Alternatively, FREEDOM enters positively and significantly in both cases. The point 
estimates are essentially the same in columns 1 and 2 (each about 0.039) and represent a sizable 
effect. A standard deviation increase in FREEDOM (about 1.262) is associated with about a 4.9% 
increase in the 5-year growth rate. We also note that all of the standard neoclassical growth model 
variables enter with the expected signs: the investment rate enters positively; initial income per 




significantly and the estimated effect is large. A standard deviation increase in ODA is associated 
with a about an 11% decrease in the 5-year growth rate. 
 Despite the similarities between most of the column 1 and column 2 results, the reported 
F-statistics suggest that the country fixed effects specification is more appropriate. (The 
unbalanced nature of our panel data does not allow for the inclusion of two-way fixed effects.) As 
well, the R
2
 in the case of country fixed effects is about 2.5 times larger (0.451 versus 0.177). 
Therefore, unless stated otherwise all subsequent growth regressions that are reported include 
country fixed effects. 
 Having seen that FREEDOM is a statistically significant correlate when DEMOC and 
CHECKS are included (but not the other way around) column 3 of Table 5 reports results based on 
including the 5 constituent freedom areas individually (rather than the comprehensive FREEDOM 
index). None of them enter significantly. (The point estimate on REGULATION is actually 
negative, though insignificant and very small.) Much of the important information is likely 
contained in the levels of these freedom measures. If this is true, the inclusion of country fixed 
effects is likely resulting in collinearity and inflated standard errors. Adding to this problem is the 
fact that the constituent freedom areas are all positively correlated with one another. (While the 
correlation between PROP_RIGHTS and SIZE_GOV is only 0.061, all other pairwise correlations 
between the 5 areas are 0.303 or greater.)  
  The next concern to be addressed is endogeneity. Despite the statistical significance of 
FREEDOM in the column 1 and 2 results, institutions are almost certainly endogenous. In addition 
to omitted variables, a country’s economic growth rate is a likely determinant of institutional 
quality. For example, if incomes are rising then the opportunity costs associated with activities 
aimed at reforms (e.g., attending city council meetings or protests) are falling. Furthermore, aid 
flows are also almost certainly endogenous. Having a lower rate of growth will likely result in a 
country being a more probable candidate for aid.  
We pursue an identification strategy along lines similar to that of Dalgaard et al. (2004). 
Specifically, we employ as instruments the lags of ODA, ODA squared, ODA multiplied by a 
policy measure (we use Freedom House’s POL_RIGHTS), ODA multiplied by population, and 




flows. However, we treat ODA and the institutional measures (DEMOC, CHECKS, and 
FREEDOM) all as endogenous. Therefore we begin by reporting first-stage regressions for all of 
these variables in Table 6. Since the inclusion of country fixed effects make degrees of freedom 
particularly dear, we focus on only the standard neoclassical controls (the investment and 
population growth rates; initial income) as predetermined variables.  
The F-statistics associated with tests of instrument joint insignificance all imply rejection of 
the null at the 1 percent level. They are not particularly large (except for ODA: 170.276). However, 
we are employing 1 set of instruments for 4 different endogenous variables. Furthermore, at least 2 
instruments (3 in the case of FREEDOM) enter significantly in any of the first-stage regressions. 
We note that one of the instruments (the lag of ODA multiplied by real GDP) does not enter 
significantly in any case (even for ODA itself). In column 4 of Table 5 we begin by reporting 
2SLS results based on the full instrument set. This provides us with an overidentifying restriction 
to test. Then, in column 5, we report results based on excluding the ostensibly weak instrument and 
see whether, for the just-identified case, any results of interest are changed. (The first-stage F-
statistics for DEMOC, CHECKS, and FREEDOM when this instrument is excluded are, 
respectively, 7.462, 3.917, and 7.675.) 
In either of the Table 5 2SLS results (column 4 or column 5) neither DEMOC nor 
CHECKS enters significantly. However, in both cases FREEDOM enters positively and 
significantly (at the 5% level or better) and the point estimate is more than twice as large as that 
reported based on OLS (columns 1 and 2). A standard deviation increase in FREEDOM is 
associated with more than a 10 percentage point increase in the 5-year growth rate. That about 2% 
annually, or what is widely considered to roughly be the long-run balanced growth rate of 
developed economies. Furthermore, ODA no longer enters significantly into the estimation when 
institutional quality is controlled for. In column 5 (the overidentified case) the J-statistic provides 
no evidence against the validity of the identification strategy. 
 Based on the results from sections 4.1 and 4.2, we can provide a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation of the indirect effect of aid flows on economic growth through its negative effects on 




FREEDOM (Table 3; column 3). In turn, a 0.478 point drop in freedom is associated with about a 
3.8 percentage point drop in the 5-year economic growth rate (Table 5; column 4).  
Finally, in Table 7 we report some growth regression results based on exploring the role of 
individual freedom areas in economic growth. Columns 1 and 2 report, respectively, period and 
country fixed effects OLS results where, instead of FREEDOM, the 5 constituent areas 
(SIZE_GOV, PROP_RIGHTS, MONEY, TRADE, and REGULATION) are included 
individually. Only in the period effects regression does an individual freedom area 
(PROP_RIGHTS) enter significantly. However, once again the F-statistics indicate that the 
inclusion country fixed effects is more appropriate. Columns 3-7 then report 2SLS results. 
Instrumenting for all 5 freedom areas simultaneously is not feasible given the availability of 
instruments. Alternatively, each estimation includes a single freedom area that is treated as 
endogenous. Treating DEMOC, CHECKS, and ODA merely as control variables now, we 
instrument for the freedom areas using lags of ODA, ODA
2
, ODA*POLITICAL_RIGHTS, and 
ODA*population. 
SIZE_GOV enters positively and significantly but the first-stage F-statistic is very small 
(0.874) (column 4). PROP_RIGHTS does not enter significantly and the F-statistics is also very 
small in its case (column 5). REGULATION also does not enter significantly (column 7).  
In the column 5 and 6 estimations, respectively, MONEY and TRADE enter positively and 
significantly (10% level or better). In both cases the first-stage F-statistics reject the joint 
insignificance null at the 1% significance level; the J-statistics offer no evidence to reject 
instrument validity. In particular, TRADE was found above to be negatively affected by aid flows 
(Table 4). Providing another back-of-the-envelope calculation, a standard deviation increase in 
ODA is associated with about a 0.978 point decrease in TRADE; this is, in turn, associated with 
about a 6.4 percentage point decrease in the 5-year growth rate. We note, however, that if all 5 
individual areas are included together in an estimation that includes country fixed effects, 
statistically significant results are not achieved. Therefore the individual freedom area results must 





Institutional quality appears to be an essential ingredient to economic growth. Considering that the 
goal of foreign aid is to help poorer economies, it is therefore doubly troubling that not only is 
there a paucity of evidence that aid promotes growth but, also, recent studies suggest that aid can 
harm institutional quality. 
 We contribute in this paper by tying together three largely disparate empirical literatures 
exploring the effects of (1) aid on growth, (2) institutions on growth, and (3) aid on institutions. 
Institutional quality is one channel through which aid flows may affect economic growth. We 
analyze a large panel of countries (for five year periods; 1970 through 2010) receiving official 
development assistance. We relate aid flows to changes in a large number of institutional quality 
variables representing both political and economic institutions. Those dimensions of institutional 
quality that are significantly affected are then subsequently included in growth regressions. Using a 
common data set and identification strategies, we aim to “connect the dots” and provide evidence 
on which dimensions of institutional quality are likely channels through which aid affects growth. 
 The evidence suggests that aid flows are, all else equal, detrimental to both political and 
economic institutions. However, in growth regressions including both types of institutions, only 
economic institutions are positively and significantly correlated with growth. Specifically, aid 
flows are associated with deterioration in the legal system and property rights of a recipient country 
and its international trade freedoms. The results of growth regressions suggest that, in turn, such 
deterioration can be associated with large, negative effects on growth. Using our point estimates, a 
standard deviation increase in aid, economic freedom, is associated with lower per capita GDP 
growth of about 2 percentage points annually. Aid is also itself included as an additional control in 
growth regressions. In our preferred specifications, the estimated effect of foreign aid is 
statistically insignificant. Once the negative effects on institutional quality are controlled for, aid is 




Table 1. Summary variables included in regression analyses 
Variable Description Source Mean Stand. Dev 
DEMOC Polity IV democracy ranking Polity IV 3.217 3.697 
FREEDOM Economic Freedom of the World index Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
5.739 1.262 
CHECKS index for number of checks and balances Keefer and Stasavage 
(2003) 
2.022 1.517 
     
ODA official development assistance to GDP ratio DAC 0.016 0.025 
     
POL_RIGHTS index of political rights Freedom House 4.357 2.015 
CIV_LIBS index of civil liberties Freedom House 4.282 1.643 
     
SIZE_GOV EFW area 1: size of government Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
6.029 1.613 
PROP_RIGHTS EFW area 2: legal structure & property rights Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
4.872 1.691 
MONEY EFW area 3: access to sound money Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
6.396 2.252 
TRADE EFW area 4: freedom to trade internationally Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
5.351 2.201 
REGULATION EFW area 5: regulations of credit, labor, & 
business 
Gwartney et al. 
(2013) 
5.855 1.196 
     






(OIL when > 0)   0.001 0.001 
SHOCKS_POS mean value of positive terms of trade growth 
rates 
UN & IMF 0.066 0.118 
SHOCKS_NEG mean value of negative terms of trade growth 
rates 
UN & IMF -0.045 0.086 





LIFE_EXPECT life expectancy at birth World Develop. 
Indicators 
61.211 10.992 
RGDP_PC real per capita GDP, 2005 US$ Penn World Tables 
8.0 
8,114.560 27,446.530 
LANGUAGE linguistic fractionalization MacroDataGuide 0.450 0.289 
ETHNIC ethnic fractionalization MacroDataGuide 0.501 0.245 
     
Investment/GDP gross capital formation as a share of GDP Penn World Tables 
8.0 
0.198 0.118 
Pop. Growth population growth rate (over 5-year periods) Penn World Tables 
8.0 
0.105 0.073 
























































































    
Redundant Fixed 
Effects 
5.989*** 4.303*** 13.513*** 
R
2 
0.165 0.305 0.296 
Countries 111 116 81 
Observations 802 732 545 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. Constants and regional dummy variables 
included in all regressions (though not reported). “Redundant fixed effects” refer to F-tests are for the null 
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DEMOC(-1) 
 










ODA per capita    


















































    
F-stat (first 
stage) 
8.924*** 9.278*** 13.465*** 
J-stat
 
0.165 1.505 0.731 
Countries 107 112 79 
Observations 676 629 481 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. Constants and regional dummy variables 
included in all regressions (though not reported). “ODA per capita” enters as the natural log of the dollar 
value plus 5. J-stats are associated with Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions. F-statistics are 
associated with tests that the instruments are jointly insignificant in the first-stage regression. Lagged 




Table 4. 2SLS period fixed effects regressions of additional institutional variables on foreign aid 
Dependent Variable 
(INST – INST(-1)) 
 
(1) 




























Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. Constants and regional dummy variables 
included in all regressions (though not reported. Lagged values of AG_SHARE, and LIFE_EXPECT are 
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SIZE_GOV   0.011 
(0.015) 
  
PROP_RIGHTS   0.012 
(0.016) 
  
MONEY   0.003 
(0.009) 
  
TRADE   0.017 
(0.014) 
  
REGULATION   -0.009 
(0.023) 
  






























































      
F-stat (Red. Fix. Effects) 1.158 2.068*** 1.985***   
J-stat    0.055  
R2 0.177 0.451 0.492   
Countries 76 76 73 78 78 
Observations 366 366 300 437 437 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and reported in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions (though not reported). Initial real GDP per capita enters 
in natural log form. The F-statistic is associated with a test of the joint insignificance of the fixed effects (period or country). In 
column 5 the instruments are lagged values of ODA, ODA2, ODA*POLITICAL_RIGHTS, ODA*population, and ODA*(real GDP). 
In column 6 the instruments are ODA, ODA2, ODA*POLITICAL_RIGHTS, and ODA*population. In 2SLS estimations DEMOC, 



















































































     
F-stat (Instruments) 6.068*** 3.204*** 5.950*** 170.276*** 
R
2 
0.710 0.544 0.621 0.698 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions 
(though not reported). Country fixed effects are also included in all regressions. The F-statistic is 
associated with the test of joint insignificance of ODA
2
, ODA*POLITICAL_RIGHTS, ODA*population, 
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    0.039 
(0.080) 















































     




     



















        
F-stat (Red. Fix. Effects) 1.542 1.985***      
F-stat (First Stage)   0.874 0.460 10.132*** 4.224*** 4.081*** 
J-stat   0.016 0.336 0.606 0.138 2.512 
R2 0.179 0.492      
Countries 73 73 78 78 78 77 78 
Observations 300 300 440 417 445 406 436 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and reported in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions (though not reported). Initial real GDP per capita enters 
in natural log form. The F-statistic is associated with a test of the joint insignificance of the fixed effects (period or country). In 2SLS 





Table 8. 48 countries included for in balanced subsample: periods 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 
1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010 
Argentina Kenya 









Congo (Democratic Republic of) Paraguay 
Congo (Republic of the) Philippines 
Costa Rica Senegal 
Dominican Republic Sierra Leone 
Egypt South Africa 
Fiji Sri Lanka 
Gabon Thailand  
Ghana Togo 
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J-stat
 
2.613 0.587 1.038 
Countries 47 47 47 
Observations 282 282 282 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and reported in parentheses. Constants and regional dummy variables 
included in all regressions (though not reported). “ODA per capita” enters as the natural log of the dollar 
value plus 5. J-stats are associated with Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions Lagged values of 
AG_SHARE and LIFE_EXPECT are employed as instruments. Subsamples is outlined in Table 8. 




Globalization and Culture 
1. Introduction 
While there is a general consensus that globalization can affect a country’s culture, whether its 
effects are desirable is more controversial. According to some authors, globalization enhances 
important cultural characteristics that promote risk-taking and allow for the merging of culture 
commonalities that reduce the costs of exchange (Inglehart and Baker (2000), Jones (2006), and 
Coyne and Williamson (2012)). These cultural characteristics have been positively linked to 
economic outcomes (Guiso et al. (2006), Tabellini (2008), and Williamson (2009)). Others argue 
that globalization leads to a loss of community identity, leading to increased income inequality 
(Rodrik (1997), Huntington (1996), Chan (2007), Bergh and Nilsson (2010)). According to this 
view, globalization comes at the cost of creating social instability and disintegration through the 
erosion of social networks. Regardless of the consequences of globalization, it is important to 
understand the role of globalization in cultural change.  
Culture is a broad concept that encompasses the values, beliefs, and social norms of a 
society. Following Porter (2000, p. 14) I define and focus on a subset of cultural characteristics 
constituted by “beliefs, attitudes, and values that bear on economic activities of individuals, 
organizations, and other institutions” (Porter, 2000 pg. 14). Using a panel of data from 91 countries 
covering 1970-2005 I then examine the relationship between globalization and a measure of 
culture. I employ the KOF globalization index values (Dreher, 2006) and data on cultural 
characteristics from the European and World Value Surveys. I also break the KOF globalization 
index into its three major sub-indices – economic, social, and political – and examine how each of 
them individually affects economic culture.  
 To my knowledge no other paper examines the relationship between a comprehensive 
measure of globalization and culture. Coyne and Williamson (2012) report that trade openness 
affects certain aspects of economic culture that Williamson (2009) has linked to economic 
development. However, trade openness is just one aspect of globalization. Cultural and other 
institutional spillovers may also be associated the social and political dimensions of globalization. 




with increases in economic freedom, and Wolf and Young (2014) find that the social (rather than 
economic or political) dimension of globalization is associated with a higher rate of income 
convergence.
1
 In examining economic culture, I report evidence on the potential effects arising 
from overall globalization, as well as economic, social, and political globalization separately. 
Any definition of culture is bound to be somewhat arbitrary. However, I closely follow the 
precedent set by existing studies of economic culture (e.g., Tabellini (2010), Williamson and 
Kerekes (2011), and Coyne and Williamson (2012)). In particular, I define culture in terms of 
several traits: (i) the tendency to trust strangers, (ii) a sense of respect for other individuals, (iii) the 
value placed on obedience to authority, and (iv) individuals’ perception of self-determination. 
These traits guide the everyday interactions of individuals and organizations and will affect 
economic activities (Tabellini, 2010). Tabellini (2010) and Williamson and Kerekes (2011) 
hypothesize that trust, respect for others, and a perceived level of self-determination will have a 
positive impact on economic interaction and exchange, while obedience will have a negative 
impact.  
In this paper I explore the relationship between economic culture and globalization. As 
Dreher et al. (2010) note, “Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national 
boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces 
complex relations of mutual interdependence” (p.1). For example, a businessman who begins 
production in a new country needs to learn the business customs of that country to be successful. In 
the process of setting up his company and learning these customs, he is exposed to the food, hotels, 
transportation, government regulations, and local business norms, among other things, in that 
country. The flow of goods and services through economic exchange exposes individuals to not 
only the particular good or service, but also to other countries’ customs and norms. A government 
official sitting on the United Nations council is exposed to the political workings of other countries 
and sees where they succeed and where they fail. A person logging onto the Internet to watch 
YouTube videos is exposed to music, television shows, beauty tips, and educational videos from 
all over the world with one click of the mouse. It is highly unlikely that a culture would stay 
                                                 
1 Internet use is a component of the KOF social globalization index. Young and Wolf employ the KOF globalization index and its 




constant when so widely exposed to others. For example, Japan has experienced high increased 
levels of globalization.  During this same time, they have experienced cultural changes as well.  As 
their businesses turned toward technical innovation and development, their culture changed as 
well.  Woman now participate in the work force and beliefs about self-determination and trust have 
also changed.  
Using a panel of 91 countries covering the years 1970-2005, my evaluation of the data 
suggests that globalization does, in fact, have a net positive and significant impact on the economic 
culture within a society. Culture is affected through the economic and social channels of 
globalization. The more globalized a country is, the more likely it is to have a culture that is 
conducive to economic development. I am aware of the likelihood of endogeneity affecting my 
results. While globalization likely influences the culture in a country, the culture in a country may 
also influence how globalized the country is. Due to the complex nature of both globalization and 
culture, it is difficult to isolate the direction. However, my findings are robust to the inclusion of 
different control variables and model specifications, including instrumental variable analysis where 
a lag of globalization serves as my instrument. These robustness checks lend additional support to 
my findings. Because of the potential for reverse causality I interpret my findings cautiously.  
To examine the question of how globalization affects economic culture, I proceed as 
follows. Section 2 examines how globalization may alter culture. A description of the data and the 
empirical framework and results are presented in section 3 and 4, respectively. Concluding 
comments constitute section 5.  
2. Globalization and Culture 
My focus on how globalization impacts culture contributes to understanding how culture evolves 
within a country. Institutional change may occur in “open societies,” that is, in societies with high 
levels of globalization. An open society may allow for piecemeal institutional change where 
individuals adopt changes that are compatible with their current institutional framework 
(Hayek,1960). This would also provide an environment for future incremental adoptions as 
globalization increases. With increased globalization, individuals are better able to observe and 
experience cultures from other regions, meaning some culture qualities are likely to spillover to the 




As a country becomes more globalized, the number of “neighbors” it has increases. No 
longer are countries’ neighbors only geographical, but with globalization, neighbors can be 
countries that have the same religion, political institutions, industries, or even popular YouTube 
sensations. Boundaries begin to erode and there is increased integration of culture. So as a 
country’s level of globalization increases, individuals are exposed to more and different kinds of 
norms, customs, and practices; they are exposed to different informal institutions that may 
spillover into their culture
2
. As individuals observe and experience these institutions, they may 
alter and adopt their own norms, customs, and practices, thus altering their culture. In this way, any 
change to culture that takes place emerges spontaneously.  
Roland (2004) describes culture as a slow moving institution. Culture evolves 
continuously, but it does so slowly. Institutions are also highly persistent and show path 
dependency (North (1990), Glaeser et al. (2004)). Some institutions become “locked in” due to 
historical reasons in the region. Yet with the introduction of new ideas, customs, and values, 
institutions still evolve over time. Individuals make gradual changes to their mental models as they 
become more interconnected and are more aware of new perceptions and ideas. These updates will 
act as an engine for institutional change (Denzau and North (1994) and Coyne and Leeson (2009)). 
Since globalization dramatically increases interconnectivity and provides a variety of interactions 
with different cultures, the number of opportunities for individuals to marginally alter their own 
ideas and customs also increases. With increased globalization, these changes may even occur at 
faster rates and the overall economic culture of the society will evolve.  
Globalization can be separated into three main dimensions: economic, political, and social. 
The inherent complexity of globalization means that not all dimensions of globalization will affect 
countries in the same way (Dreher et al 2008). All three dimensions provide the opportunities for 
creating networks of connections that allow for the flow of new information and ideas. Then all 
three dimensions provide a possible mechanism for gradual cultural change.  
                                                 
2 While no study has directly examined spillover effects from globalization or of informal institutions, there is a growing literature 
examining institutional spillovers in general. Many of these studies examine how such spillovers affect economic development. 
Bosker and Garretsen (2009) find that institutional quality in neighboring countries is an important determinant of economic growth. 
Similarly, de Groot (2011) analyzes how the expansion of political freedoms in neighboring countries leads to spillovers in the home 
country and Simmons and Elkins (2004) find that not only do countries copy their neighbor’s policies; they tend to mainly copy the 





For example, economic globalization is “characterized as long distance flows of goods, 
capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges” 
(Dreher (2006) p. 1092). As economic globalization increases, more trade will take place with a 
greater number of individuals; trade will no longer be limited to small networks but will expand to 
larger degrees of market participation. If exchanges are continually done successfully to the 
satisfaction of participates, the amount of trust in a society is likely to increase. Economic 
globalization may also alter the cultural aspect of trust by increasing the need for long term 
contracts. If these contracts are continually met and fulfilled, this has the potential to increase the 
amount of trust individuals in a society have. However, if these contracts are continually broken, 
trust could decrease as a result. With increase economic globalization, there will also be new 
opportunities for entrepreneurship. This will also likely alter the underlying economic culture of a 
region, potentially increasing the amount of control individuals believe they have over their lives.  
Political globalization also has the potential to influence culture. Involvement with the 
United Nations or international organizations, the prevalence of embassies, and grants conditional 
on political grounds all represent potential avenues for political globalization. This type of 
globalization may affect culture, for example, through altering individuals’ beliefs on obedience. 
Exposure to political systems that require different levels of citizen participation may alter people’s 
beliefs on or willingness to follow commands from perceived authority figures. For example, if 
exposure to different political systems causes citizens in an authoritarian regime to begin to 
question the legitimacy of its ruler, the underlying culture may change to be more conducive 
towards entrepreneurship. Alternatively, if exposure to political systems where greater levels of 
obedience is needed to support things like a large welfare state, the culture may change to be less 
conducive towards entrepreneurship.  
Social globalization involves the spreading of ideas and information. This form of 
globalization is often identified most with changing a country’s culture. With increased social 
globalization, new social relationships can form, potentially altering individuals’ tolerance for 
values, beliefs, and choices different to their own. This may later translate into a greater 
willingness to engage in economic activities with more people or with greater willingness to adapt 




in social disintegration; as people perceive losing their identity, they may become less tolerant of 
others, show less respect, potentially altering culture so that it is less conducive to 
entrepreneurship.  
 Different dimensions of globalization may not affect culture in the same way. In some 
cases, increased economic globalization may move culture towards one conducive to 
entrepreneurship and increased political globalization may move culture away from this. The 
opposite may also occur. It is not clear that the effects of globalization will be the same for 
different dimensions or that they will affect culture in the same way.  
  As identified by Cowen (2002) and Coyne and Williamson (2012), the process of cultural 
exchange will also create cultural creative destruction. Cultural exchange will destroy existing 
economic culture on some margins and will enhance it on other margins. This could have either 
positive or negative effects on culture. If globalization results in erosion of already existing social 
networks, it may have on net a negative influence. However, if globalization promotes views of 
entrepreneurship by increasing the number of opportunities for interaction, net effects may be 
positive. In examining trade openness’ effect on economic culture, Coyne and Williamson find that 
on net, increased trade openness has a positive effect on culture.  
 The three dimensions of globalization may also affect culture at different rates. Social 
globalizations effects may be seen faster than economic or political globalization effects. This will 
likely depend on which areas of culture the dimensions are altering.  
3. Data  
3.1. Globalization 
I use the KOF index of globalization (Dreher, 2006 and Dreher et. al 2008) as a measure of a 
country’s level of globalization. This index is widely used in empirical studies and linked to 
multiple positive economic outcomes. Globalization is associated with higher rates of economic 
growth (Dreher, 2006), life expectancy (Bergh, 2010), and reports of subjective well-being 
(Hessami, 2011). The KOF index is a weighted average of the three constituent sub-indices: 
economic, social, and political. The globalization index and its sub-indices are measured on a scale 
of 0 to 100 and are measured annually. Data is available from 1970 to 2010 on a yearly basis for 




five-year averages (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984,1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 
2000-2004).  
The economic globalization index consists of two components: flows and restrictions. 
Economic flows are measured by trade, foreign direct investment flows, portfolio investment and 
income paid abroad to foreign nationals, all as percentages of GDP. Restrictions measure hidden 
import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions.  
The social globalization index consists of three components: personal contacts, information 
flows, and cultural proximity. The component personal contacts is measure by telephone traffic, 
transfers as a percent of GDP, percent of the total population that are foreign or foreign-born 
residents, number of international letters sent and received per capita, and international tourism. 
Information flows consists of the number of Internet users, televisions, and trade in newspapers. 
Cultural proximity is made up of the number of McDonald’s restaurants and the number of Ikeas 
per capita and the trade in books as a percent of GDP. By measuring these areas, social 
globalization examines the spread of ideas, information, images, and people (Dreher, 2006).  
The political globalization index is the simplest of the indices and measures the diffusion 
of government policies. It is measured by the number of embassies in the country, membership in 
international organizations, participation in U.N. Security Council missions, and participation in 
international treaties.  
3.2.  Culture 
Identifying and measuring culture and informal institutions is challenging. In measuring culture, I 
focus on cultural characteristics that are pertinent for economic interaction and exchange. One 
method to measure culture is to use survey research in an attempt to capture individuals’ 
expectations and beliefs (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In order to measure culture, I use a culture 
variable identified by Tabellini (2010) and expanded upon by Williamson and Kerekes (2010). The 
cultural variable identifies cultural traits that serve as constraints on entrepreneurial behavior and 
have been shown to correlate with economic development (Coyne and Williamson, 2012). This 
measure of culture has four components: 1. trust, 2. control and individual self-determination, 3. 
respect, and 4. obedience. The culture variable is created using questions identified in the 




WVS that have been conducted in 91 countries questions are meant to reflect the local norms and 
customs in countries. Each component comes from a specific question in the surveys.  
Trust is identified by the question, “Generally speaking, would you say most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The level of trust is measured by 
the percentage of respondents that answered “Most people can be trusted” as opposed to “Can’t be 
too careful” and “Don’t know”. Control and individual self-determination, is identified by the 
question, “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while 
other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale 
(from 1 to 10) where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much 
freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way your life turns out”. The control 
component is measured by aggregating the answers, averaging by the number of responses, and 
multiplying by 10. 
Respect and obedience, are both identified by the same question, “Here is a list of qualities 
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five.” Respect is defined as the percent of respondents in each 
country who list “tolerance and respect for other people” as being important and obedience is 
defined as the percent of respondents who list “obedience”.  
Trust, respect, and individual self-determination are thought to encourage entrepreneurial 
activity while obedience is thought to hinder (Tabellini, 2010). I follow Coyne and Williamson 
(2012) and sum trust, control and respect and subtract the obedience score to create an aggregate 
variable meant to measure economic culture. This measure is then converted to a relative scale 
ranging for 0 to 10 with 0 representing weak culture for entrepreneurship and 10 representing 
strong for each country, for each time period. The EVS and WVS have five waves, 1981-1984, 
1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007. To maximize the number of periods included 
in my analysis, I match the values obtained for each country from the first wave, 1981-1984, with 
the 1980-1984 time period and continue so that the fifth wave, 2005-2007, matches with the 2000-
2004 time periods. Examples of countries with high culture scores include Sweden, Norway, 
Switzerland, and New Zealand while Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia, and Burkina Faso are examples of 




3.3. Control variables 
The data I use for my control variables are those identified in the literature as being important 
influences on culture (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), Rodrik, Sunbramanian, 
and Trebbi (2004) and Tabellini (2010)) and employed by Coyne and Williamson (2012). These 
variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Country size, gross domestic 
product (GDP), GDP growth, and urban population are all identified in the literature as potentially 
influencing a country’s economic culture. For example, Inglehart and Baker (2000) note that 
culture changes occur once a society begins to industrialize. Country size, gross domestic product 
(GDP), per capita GDP growth, and urban population are all important for industrialization. For 
country size, I use the logarithm of total population and the logarithm of total area of a country. 
GDP is measured by constant 2005 international dollars and GDP growth is the per capita annual 
growth rate. Urban population is measured by the percentage of the population living in urban 
areas. I take average values over five year time periods for each control variable for the years 
1980-1984,1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. Descriptions, sources, and 
summary statistics of all variables are provided in table 1.  
4. Empirical Framework 
I examine an unbalanced panel of data from 91 countries surveyed in the European and World 
Value Surveys. A list of the countries included can be found in Table 18. The data consists of 
seven five year time periods beginning in 1970 and ending in 2004. I break the time span into 
seven periods for which I take average values (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004). The five waves for my dependent variable, culture, 1981-
1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007 with average values of my independent 
variables in the time periods 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. My 
variable of interest is a measurement of the level of globalization in a country.  
The KOF globalization index covers the years 1970-2010. Because culture is persistent 
over time globalization likely only affects economic cultural change over time. Table 11 reports 
correlations between economic culture and globalization for lags varying from zero 
(contemporaneous) to six. The correlation between culture and the different lags of globalization is 




average correlation when examining all globalization components. A two-period lag still allows for 
culture to take time to change; in my analysis, I use a two-period lag for my measurement of 
globalization
3
. With this lag structure, globalization from the 1970-1974 average will be paired 
with cultural data from the 1981-1984 wave and control variable data from 1980-1984.  
Figure 1 presents scatter plots of culture versus the KOF globalization index values and the 
separate components of globalization (political, economic, and social). The best-fit ordinary least 
squares (OLS) lines show a positive relationship between the level of globalization in a country 
and its level of culture. A higher level of globalization (and its components) corresponds to a 
higher level of culture in that country. This result suggests that further investigation is warranted.  
 Partly because of collinearity concerns, I start with a simple OLS regression that shows the 
basic relationship between the cultural index, and the four measurements of globalization. This 
serves as a benchmark for later regressions. The following general specification is used: 
(1)  ititit vGLOBCulture  210   
Based on general specification (1), Table 11 reports the results of both pooled OLS 
regressions and random effects regressions. Columns 1-5 report pooled OLS, columns 6-10 report 
results using random effects and columns 11-15 report results using random and period effects. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects suggests that a random effects 
model is appropriate to use for my specification. The Hausman test for each regression also shows 
the superiority of a random effects model over fixed effects in the regressions. Additionally, I 
perform a joint test for my period effects to see if all the year coefficients are jointly equal to zero; 
Chi
2
 results are reported in Table 11. In all cases, I reject the null; it is likely that time period 
effects are necessary.  
 The coefficients for globalization and all of its components are positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The coefficients are also extremely similar across the different 
specifications. A standard deviation increase in globalization or social globalization is associated 
with approximately a 0.70 percent standard deviation increase in culture; a standard deviation 
increase in economic globalization is associated with approximately a 0.60 percent standard 
                                                 
3 I also considered a three period lag structure. The baseline estimates do not alter in sign and the magnitudes are not meaningfully 




deviation increase in culture; and a standard deviation increase in political globalization is 
associated with approximately a 0.40 percent standard deviation increase in culture. These findings 
imply that the more globalized a country is, the higher the level of culture in that country. These 
results serve as a benchmark specification.  
The variation for these benchmark results is seen when the components of globalization, 
economic, social, and political, are included in the specification at the same time. In these 
specifications, economic globalization is not significantly different from zero in columns 5, 10 and 
15; however, its sign does switch from being negative to positive. Social globalization is positive 
and significant in all three regressions at the one percent level and political globalization is positive 
and significant at the five to ten percent level, depending on the specification. When all three 
dimensions of globalization are controlled for, it appears that increased social and political 
globalization positively impacts the culture of a country. The results in Table 11 serve as a 
benchmark specification.  
Next, I introduce my controls to the model:  
 (2)  ititzitit vZGLOBCulture    210  
Where itz  is a vector of my control variables.  
 Table 13 reports the results of the random effects model when the control variables are 
included; the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier and the Hausman test both again support the use 
of a random effects model. Chi
2
 statistics for period fixed effects are reported for each regression 
with time period effects. The coefficient for GLOB is positive and significant; this implies the 
more globalized a country is, the higher the level of culture in that country. Political globalization, 
while positive, is no longer significant. Both economic and social globalization are positive and 
significant. The channels through which globalization impacts culture appear to be the level of 
economic and social globalization. The globalization results reported in column 2 and 3 suggest 
that a standard deviation increase in economic globalization is associated with a 32 percent 
standard deviation increase in culture and a standard deviation increase in political globalization is 
associated with a 49 percent standard deviation increase in culture. This corresponds to a 0.26 and 




similar to Bulgaria or Turkey’s to one like Poland. When economic, social, and political 
globalization are included in the same regression, only social globalization is significant.  
 The log of population is consistently negative and significant in my results and the log of 
GDP is consistently positive and significant. Increases in population appear to negatively impact a 
country’s culture while increases in GDP appear to positively impact culture. For example, in 
columns 3 and 8, when examining social globalization’s impact on culture, a one percent increase 
in the population of a country decreases the level of the culture index by 0.532 and 0.334 units and 
a one percent increase in the level of GDP increases the level of culture by 0.276 and 0.313 units. 
This is again similar to moving from a culture like Bulgaria’s to one like Polands. The adjusted R-
squared value also increases from Table 12 to Table 13, suggesting that the additional controls 
help to explain the variation in culture.  
  In order to provide a more complete model estimation, I use a two stage least square 
(2SLS) approach to re-estimate the random effects model using instrumental variable analysis. My 
identification strategy is to use a one-period lag of my proxy for globalization, meaning three-
period lag instruments for the two-period lagged value of globalization. While using a lagged 
instrument is not a perfect solution, it is difficult to find good instruments that correlate with the 
exogenous variables but not with the error term. In using a lagged variable, I follow recent 
literature that examines culture (Williamson (2009) and Coyne and Williamson (2012)). Therefore, 
I use the lagged value of globalization instead of weaker instruments. The first stage F-stats shown 
in Table 14. My instrument passes the null hypothesis for weak instruments. Since the data for 
globalization starts in 1970, this means the culture data from the 1981 wave can no longer be 
included in the analysis, dropping the number of observations I have for the estimation.  
 Table 14 reports the results of the random effects model both with and without period 
fixed effects for the 2SLS estimations. The estimated effect of globalization is positive and 
significant at the one percent level for both specifications. Political globalization is still positive 
and insignificant. Economic and social globalization are both positive and significant at the five 
percent level or better. It appears that globalization impacts culture through the economic and 
social channels. The coefficients for columns 1-4 are very similar to those from the OLS random 




magnitude is slightly larger. The globalization results reported in column 6 and 7 suggest that a 
standard deviation increase in economic globalization is associated with a 34 percent standard 
deviation increase in culture and a standard deviation increase in political globalization is 
associated with a 52 percent standard deviation increase in culture.  
I perform a robustness check by using additional control variables. The level of education 
within a country may affect how culture evolves and how globalization is able to influence culture. 
Tabellini (2010) shows that a higher educated population may adopt better institutions. 
Additionally, how similar the citizens of a country are to their neighbors may influence how 
culture changes and what institutions are adopted. I use the percent of secondary school-aged 
children enrolled in secondary school from the World Bank as a proxy for the level of education. I 
also use data from Alesina et al. (2003) and measure ethnic fractionalization by the probability that 
two members of the population belong to the same ethnic group.  
Table 15 presents the regression results with these additional controls for a random effects 
2SLS model. Similar to earlier results, globalization, economic globalization, and social 
globalization have a positive and significant effect on culture. Economic globalization is now the 
only significant variable of interest. Political globalization is not significant from zero and when 
economic, social, and political globalization are considered simultaneously, only social 
globalization appears to affect cultural levels. Ethnic fractionalization is negative and significant in 
all regressions. Greater levels of ethnic fractionalization affect culture negatively. The level of 
education in a country is positive and significant in columns 1, 4, 6, 8, and 9. The result is strongest 
in columns 4 and 9 i.e. the regressions where only social globalization is considered. In this case, 
the level of education positively affects culture when the measure of globalization is not 
significant. With the additional controls, log of population and log of GDP are only significant 
when social globalization is considered or when the three different dimensions of globalization are 
considered simultaneously.  
I also perform a “long cross-section” analysis of my data. Here I examine how the average 
values of globalization and my control variables affect the average value of my culture variable. I 
average culture and my control variables from 1980 to 2004 and globalization and its dimensions 




index of globalization is again positive and significant but now only at the ten percent level. Of the 
sub-indices of globalization, only social globalization is significant. When all three dimensions are 
included, social globalization is again the only dimension that is significant. Higher levels of social 
globalization positively impact culture. 
My final robustness check involves creating a new culture variable. To do this, I follow 
Coyne and Williamson (2012) and perform a principal component analysis (PCA) on the culture 
data. PCA extracts the common variation between the four components of the culture variable, 
creating an overall net measure of the culture needed for economic development (Coyne and 
Williamson, 2012). In this way, I am able to ensure my results are not sensitive to the construction 
of the variable. The PCA results are shown in Table 17. The results are very similar to the earlier 
results when the culture variable was used. Globalization is still positive and significant, but now 
only at the ten percent level. Economic and political globalization are not statistically significant. 
Social globalization appears to be the dimension that globalization affects culture through; social 
globalization is positive and significant both when it is included alone and when included with 
economic and political globalization. Also similar to earlier results, the log of population is 
negative and significant and the log of GDP is positive and significant except when social 
globalization is included in the specification. The similarity of these results to my earlier results 
suggests my results are not sensitive to the construction of my culture variable.  
5. Conclusion   
Using a panel data set of 91 countries with data spanning from 1970-2005 and using a cultural 
variable constructed from the European Value Surveys and the World Value Surveys, I conclude 
that globalization has a positive impact on countries’ culture. In particular, the culture is impacted 
through the social globalization within a country. Increased globalization moves a society’s culture 
towards one more conducive to entrepreneurship and economic growth.  
Globalization is generally considered to influence culture within societies but it is not well 
understood how globalization impacts culture. This paper empirically examines what dimensions 
of globalization affect economic culture. As globalization increases, culture also changes and 




implications for growth. As globalization continues to become more prevalent local culture will 








Notes: Culture is an index created using variables from the European Value Survey and the World Value 
Survey and is measured on the vertical axes. Globalization is the KOF Index of Globalization and the 
subcomponents of globalization –economic, social, and political – are the KOF Index of Globalization. Average 
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Table 10. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Source Mean Std Dev 
CULTURE cultural traits important for entrepreneurship European and World 
Value Survey 
5.647 0.818 
RESPECT respect and tolerance as a quality one wants to pass 
on to their children 
European and World 
Value Survey 
0.674 0.133 
OBEDIENCE obedience as a quality one wants to pass on to their 
children 
European and World 
Value Survey 
0.360 0.170 
TRUST belief of if most people can be trusted European and World 
Value Survey 
0.294 0.152 
CONTROL belief of if have free choice and control over life European and World 
Value Survey 
0.636 0.133 
     
GLOB KOF Index of Globalization Dreher (2006) 53.736 18.657 
ECON_GLOB economic dimension of KOF Dreher (2006) 53.411 20.043 
SOC_GLOB social dimension of KOF Dreher (2006) 46.943 22.476 
POL_GLOB political dimension of KOF Dreher (2006) 63.633 23.229 
GLOB(-10) KOF Index of Globalization, lagged 10 years Dreher (2006) 49.463 17.896 
ECON_GLOB(-10) economic dimension of KOF, lagged 10 years Dreher (2006) 48.941 19.250 
SOC_GLOB(-10) social dimension of KOF, lagged 10 years Dreher (2006) 42.992 21.581 
POL_GLOB(-10) political dimension of KOF, lagged 10 years Dreher (2006) 59.252 23.219 
     
LPOP natural log of total population World Development 
Indicators 
16.213 1.696 
LLAND natural log of the total land area World Development 
Indicators 
12.101 2.137 
URBAN_POP percent of population living in urban areas World Development 
Indicators 
56.022 23.498 
LGDP natural log of GDP World Development 
Indicators 
25.465 1.725 
GDP_PCGROWTH growth rate of per capita GDP World Development 
Indicators 
0.101 0.166 





ETHNIC probability that two randomly drawn individuals 
(from a country) are not from the same group 
Alesina et al. (2003) 0.375 0.238 
Note: Panel is unbalanced across 91 countries 
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Table 11. Correlation Table for lags of globalization and the economic, political, and social 









glob 0.614 220 e_glob 0.535 217 p_glob 0.347 223 s_glob 0.628 223 
glob(-1) 0.617 206 e_glob(-1) 0.528 203 p_glob(-1) 0.372 209 s_glob(-1) 0.628 209 
glob(-2) 0.627 194 e_glob(-2) 0.499 191 p_glob(-2) 0.421 197 s_glob(-2) 0.633 197 
glob(-3) 0.635 169 e_glob(-3) 0.500 166 p_glob(-3) 0.445 172 s_glob(-3) 0.630 172 
glob(-4) 0.647 136 e_glob(-4) 0.487 133 p_glob(-4) 0.453 139 s_glob(-4) 0.640 139 
glob(-5) 0.639 101 e_glob(-5) 0.459 98 p_glob(-5) 0.457 103 s_glob(-5) 0.628 103 




Table 12. Benchmark regressions of culture on globalization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 























GLOB(-10) 0.032***     0.032***     
 (0.006)     (0.004)     
ECON_GLOB(-10)  0.025***   -0.005  0.025***   0.002 
  (0.005)   (0.006)  (0.004)   (0.005) 
SOC_GLOB(-10)   0.026***  0.027***   0.026***  0.022*** 
   (0.005)  (0.006)   (0.004)  (0.005) 
POL_GLOB(-10)    0.017*** 0.008*    0.015*** 0.007** 
    (0.004) (0.004)    (0.004) (0.003) 
           
Adj R
2 
0.389 0.245 0.398 0.173 0.424 0.427 0.249 0.401 0.177 0.393 
Countries 78 76 80 80 76 78 76 80 80 76 
Observations 194 191 197 197 191 194 191 197 197 191 
 





























     
GLOB(-10) 0.031*** 
         
 
(0.005) 

















     




     
POL_GLOB(-10) 
   
0.012*** 0.007** 
     
    
(0.003) (0.003) 
     
Chi2-stat (Per. Fixed Effect) 40.27*** 45.43*** 36.92*** 59.45*** 36.98*** 
     
           
Adj R
2 
0.404 0.253 0.412 0.154 0.435 
     
Countries 78 76 80 80 76 
     
Observations 194 191 197 197 191 
     Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Constants, though not reported, are included in all regressions 
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Table 13. Random effects model of culture on globalization with controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Culture         
         
GLOB(-10) 0.020*** 
    
0.016** 
    
 
(0.006) 
    
(0.007) 




































   
0.003 -0.001 
   
0.002 -0.001 
    
(0.004) (0.004) 
   
(0.004) (0.004) 
LPOP -0.323** -0.426*** -0.262* 
-




(0.139) (0.149) (0.147) (0.133) (0.152) (0.150) (0.156) (0.159) (0.136) (0.164) 
LLAND 0.072 0.096 0.084 0.055 0.103* 0.087 0.111* 0.095 0.079 0.115* 
 
(0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.054) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061) 
LGDP 0.306*** 0.409*** 0.276** 0.517*** 0.284** 0.316*** 0.411*** 0.313*** 0.478*** 0.313*** 
 
(0.108) (0.106) (0.109) (0.093) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.112) (0.091) (0.116) 
URBAN_POP -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDP_PCGROWTH 0.216 0.293 0.273 0.313 0.278 0.314 0.357 0.342 0.302 0.366 
 
(0.236) (0.241) (0.215) (0.253) (0.236) (0.216) (0.223) (0.208) (0.225) (0.223) 




(Per Fixed Effect) 
     45.20*** 50.67*** 43.50*** 53.56*** 44.08*** 
Adj R
2
 0.467 0.448 0.483 0.437 0.483 0.487 0.470 0.500 0.453 0.503 
Countries 74 72 74 74 72 74 72 74 74 72 
Observations 186 183 186 186 183 186 183 186 186 183 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not reported, 






Table 14. 2SLS random effects model of culture on globalization with controls 




        
                      
GLOB(-10) 0.021*** 
    
0.027*** 
    
 
(0.007) 
    
(0.008) 




































   
0.004 -0.001 
   
0.005 -0.000 
    
(0.004) (0.005) 










(0.158) (0.152) (0.167) (0.110) (0.150) (0.163) (0.158) (0.173) (0.142) (0.175) 
LLAND 0.086 0.111* 0.102* 0.071 0.105** 0.087 0.118* 0.107* 0.071 0.121* 
 
(0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.046) (0.053) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) 
LGDP 0.248* 0.378*** 0.212 0.589*** 0.273** 0.187 0.353*** 0.144 0.435*** 0.171 
 
(0.136) (0.125) (0.140) (0.090) (0.127) (0.139) (0.128) (0.142) (0.118) (0.146) 
URBAN_POP -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP_PCGROWTH 0.225 0.334 0.311 0.758* 0.427 0.322 0.406 0.392 0.293 0.404 
 
(0.276) (0.272) (0.268) (0.418) (0.322) (0.268) (0.273) (0.268) (0.279) (0.286) 
           
Period Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat (first stage) 76.03*** 49.03*** 29.29*** 15.69*** 29.54*** 59.48*** 39.83*** 24.37*** 16.13*** 30.19*** 
Countries 70 68 70 70 68 70 68 70 70 68 
Observations 163 160 163 163 160 163 160 163 163 160 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not reported, 






Table 15. 2SLS random effects model of culture on globalization with ethnic and education 
controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent Variable: Culture 
GLOB(-10) 0.021***     0.025***     
 (0.008)     (0.008)     
ECON_GLOB(-10)  0.014**   0.004  0.017**   0.005 
  (0.007)   (0.008)  (0.007)   (0.009) 
SOC_GLOB(-10)   0.020***  0.020**   0.025***  0.023*** 
   (0.006)  (0.008)   (0.007)  (0.008) 
POL_GLOB(-10)    0.000 -0.005    0.002 -0.005 
    (0.004) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.006) 
LPOP -0.119 -0.207 -0.039 -0.372*** -0.041 -0.055 -0.170 0.046 -0.310** 0.040 
 (0.161) (0.153) (0.165) (0.128) (0.161) (0.168) (0.161) (0.173) (0.153) (0.173) 
LLAND 0.141** 0.161** 0.152** 0.145*** 0.168*** 0.124* 0.149** 0.136** 0.126* 0.155** 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.050) (0.065) (0.068) (0.070) (0.066) (0.073) (0.069) 
LGDP 0.047 0.137 0.001 0.301*** 0.020 -0.001 0.115 -0.058 0.241* -0.039 
 (0.141) (0.130) (0.140) (0.108) (0.138) (0.144) (0.134) (0.143) (0.130) (0.145) 
URBAN_POP -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP_PCGROWTH 0.188 -0.289 0.276 0.367 0.363 0.322 0.414 0.409 0.345 0.502* 
 (0.288) 0.006 (0.278) (0.404) (0.304) (0.280) (0.287) (0.277) (0.291) (0.294) 
SEC_EDU 0.006* -0.004 0.005 0.012*** 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.006* 0.008** 0.005 
 (0.003) -1.046*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ETHNIC -0.975*** -0.386 -0.953*** -0.787*** -1.005*** -0.823** -0.924** -0.792** -0.743* -0.859** 
 (0.368)  (0.357) (0.273) (0.361) (0.385) (0.401) (0.374) (0.402) (0.388) 
           
Period Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat (first stage) 69.45*** 44.06*** 29.90*** 11.01*** 31.64*** 49.13*** 38.93*** 24.30*** 16.19*** 35.96*** 
Countries 65 64 65 65 64 65 64 65 65 64 
Observations 152 150 152 152 150 152 150 152 152 150 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not 
reported, are included in all regressions. 




Table 16. OLS Long Cross Section 




               
GLOB 0.012* 
    
 
(0.007) 



















   
0.001 -0.002 
    
(0.004) (0.004) 
LPOP -0.372*** -0.475*** -0.203 -0.508*** -0.241 
 
(0.132) (0.127) (0.155) (0.112) (0.161) 
LLAND 0.089* 0.106* 0.097* 0.083 0.110** 
 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) 
LGDP 0.329*** 0.430*** 0.202* 0.462*** 0.242** 
 
(0.108) (0.091) (0.116) (0.086) (0.118) 
URBAN_POP -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP_PCGROWTH 0.038 0.039 0.044* 0.039 0.047 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032) 
      Countries 88 86 88 88 86 
Adj R
2
 0.504 0.505 0.537 0.484 0.535 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in 






Table 17. 2SLS random effects model of PCA Culture on globalization with controls 





       
                      
GLOB(-10) 0.024** 
    
0.031** 
    
 
(0.012) 
    
(0.013) 




































   
0.005 -0.001 
   
0.007 0.001 
    
(0.008) (0.008) 
   
(0.009) (0.009) 
LPOP -0.506** -0.651*** -0.429* -0.782*** -0.444* -0.403 -0.613** -0.290 -0.709*** -0.329 
 
(0.245) (0.233) (0.261) (0.186) (0.235) (0.252) (0.242) (0.266) (0.215) (0.270) 
LLAND 0.146 0.172* 0.164* 0.123 0.167** 0.146 0.176* 0.168* 0.126 0.176* 
 
(0.089) (0.092) (0.089) (0.081) (0.082) (0.091) (0.095) (0.090) (0.096) (0.098) 
LGDP 0.433** 0.575*** 0.391* 0.704*** 0.412** 0.336 0.539*** 0.271 0.618*** 0.298 
 
(0.211) (0.193) (0.219) (0.156) (0.198) (0.215) (0.198) (0.220) (0.178) (0.225) 
URBAN_POP -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDP_PCGROWTH 0.028 0.172 0.136 0.205 0.346 0.071 0.189 0.171 0.035 0.194 
 
(0.453) (0.454) (0.437) (0.505) (0.515) (0.428) (0.440) (0.424) (0.446) (0.454) 
           
Period Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stat (first stage) 76.03*** 49.03*** 29.29*** 15.69*** 29.54*** 59.48*** 39.83*** 24.37*** 16.13*** 30.19*** 
Countries 70 68 70 70 68 70 68 70 70 68 
Observations 168 165 168 168 165 168 165 168 168 165 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not 




Table 18. Countries Included in Culture Analysis 
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Albania   X X  Kyrgyz Republic    X  
Algeria    X  Latvia  X X X  
Argentina X X X X X Lithuania  X X X  
Armenia   X   Luxembourg    X  
Australia X  X  X Macedonia, FYR   X X  
Austria  X  X  Malaysia     X 
Azerbaijan   X   Mali     X 
Bangladesh   X X  Malta X X  X  
Belarus   X X  Mexico X X X X X 
Belgium X X  X  Moldova   X X X 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   X X  Montenegro      
Brazil  X X  X Morocco    X X 
Bulgaria  X X X X Netherlands X X  X X 
Burkina Faso     X New Zealand   X  X 
Canada X X  X X Nigeria  X X X  
Chile  X X X X Norway X X X  X 
China  X X X X Pakistan    X  
Colombia   X  X Peru   X X X 
Croatia   X   Philippines   X X  
Cyprus     X Poland    X X 
Czech Republic  X X X  Portugal  X  X  
Denmark X X  X  Romania  X X X X 
Dominican Republic   X   Russian Federation  X X X X 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    X X Rwanda     X 
El Salvador   X   Saudi Arabia    X  
Estonia  X X X  Serbia   X X X 
Ethiopia    X  Singapore    X  
Finland  X X X X Slovak Republic  X X X  
France X X  X X Slovenia  X X X X 
Georgia   X  X South Africa X X X X X 
Germany  X X X X Spain X X X X X 
Ghana     X Sweden X X X X X 
Greece    X  Switzerland  X X  X 
Hong Kong SAR, China     X Tanzania    X  
Hungary X X X X  Thailand     X 
Iceland X X  X  Trinidad and Tobago     X 
India  X X X X Turkey   X X X 
Indonesia    X X Uganda    X  
Iran, Islamic Rep.    X X Ukraine   X X X 
Iraq    X X United Kingdom X X  X X 
Ireland X X  X  United States X X X X X 
Israel      Uruguay   X  X 
Italy X X  X X Venezuela, RB   X X  
Japan X X X X X Vietnam    X X 
Jordan    X X Zambia     X 
Korea, Rep. X X  X X 
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Table 19. Covariance Analysis: Ordinary, Sample adjusted 5-9, 208 observations after adjustments 
 











             
respect 0.548 1 
            
obedience -0.632 0.063 1 
           
trust 0.792 0.216 -0.405 1 
          
control 0.428 0.374 0.110 0.177 1 
         
glob 0.624 0.496 -0.244 0.407 0.484 1 
        
econ_glob 0.557 0.450 -0.185 0.338 0.530 0.904 1 
       
soc_glob 0.636 0.491 -0.352 0.372 0.394 0.919 0.828 1 
      
pol_glob 0.363 0.301 -0.032 0.324 0.318 0.709 0.451 0.436 1 
     
lpop -0.100 -0.108 0.116 0.060 -0.111 -0.150 -0.331 -0.334 0.371 1 
    
lland 0.049 0.064 0.141 0.136 0.121 -0.032 -0.215 -0.195 0.403 0.747 1 
   
urban_pop 0.476 0.270 -0.343 0.239 0.356 0.613 0.537 0.631 0.359 -0.261 -0.008 1 
  
lgdp 0.284 0.107 -0.159 0.289 0.116 0.330 0.096 0.181 0.615 0.814 0.656 0.220 1 
 





Table 20. Benchmark regressions of culture on globalization, 3- period lag. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 























GLOB(-15) 0.035***     0.032***     
 (0.006)     (0.005)     
ECON_GLOB(-15)  0.027***   -0.004  0.024***   0.004 
  (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.004)   (0.005) 
SOC_GLOB(-15)   0.028***  0.026***   0.024***  0.018*** 
   (0.005)  (0.007)   (0.004)  (0.005) 
POL_GLOB(-15)    0.018*** 0.009*    0.016*** 0.010** 
    (0.004) (0.004)    (0.004) (0.004) 





0.400 0.245 0.397 0.193 0.426 0.403 0.250 0.397 0.198 0.426 
Countries 74 72 76 76 72 74 72 76 76 72 
Observations 169 166 172 172 166 169 166 172 172 166 
 
          
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
     
VARIABLES 
Random Effects 














with Period Effects 
     GLOB(-15) 0.034***     
      (0.005)     
     ECON_GLOB(-15)  0.025***   0.002 
       (0.005)   (0.005) 
     SOC_GLOB(-15)   0.025***  0.020*** 
        (0.004)  (0.005) 
     POL_GLOB(-15)    0.016*** 0.010** 
         (0.004) (0.004) 
     Chi
2
-stat 
(Per. Fixed Effect) 
15.32*** 10.54** 15.95*** 16.53*** 17.19*** 
     Adj R
2 
0.406 0.250 0.405 0.197 0.435 
     Countries 74 72 76 76 72 
     Observations 169 166 172 172 166 
     Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not 





Table 21. Random effects model of culture on globalization with controls, 3-period lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Dependent Variable: Culture 
GLOB(-15) 0.018**     0.019**     
 (0.009)     (0.009)     
ECON_ 
GLOB(-15) 
 0.008   -0.003  0.009   -0.002 
  (0.006)   (0.007)  (0.006)   (0.007) 
SOC_ 
GLOB(-15) 
  0.019**  0.020**   0.020***  0.021** 
   (0.007)  (0.009)   (0.008)  (0.009) 
POL_ 
GLOB(-15) 
   0.003 -0.000    0.003 -0.001 
    (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.006) 
LPOP -0.429** -0.601*** -0.314 -0.643*** -0.347* -0.411** -0.592*** -0.282 -0.641*** -0.320 
 (0.172) (0.176) (0.202) (0.147) (0.198) (0.174) (0.178) (0.204) (0.147) (0.201) 
LLAND 0.072 0.094 0.087 0.070 0.093 0.076 0.101 0.093 0.075 0.102 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.064) 
LGDP 0.404*** 0.557*** 0.317** 0.589*** 0.342** 0.381*** 0.543*** 0.282* 0.583*** 0.312** 
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.151) (0.113) (0.150) (0.143) (0.132) (0.155) (0.113) (0.154) 
URBAN_POP -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
GDP_ 
PCGROWTH 
0.778 0.854 0.915 0.773 0.953 0.898 0.992 1.043* 0.842 1.108 
 (0.613) (0.593) (0.564) (0.650) (0.645) (0.671) (0.673) (0.626) (0.711) (0.719) 
           






     13.11*** 12.42*** 13.84*** 13.18*** 13.89*** 
Adj R
2
 0.468 0.452 0.489 0.442 0.485 0.468 0.451 0.492 0.438 0.489 
Countries 163 160 163 163 160 163 160 163 163 160 
Observations 0.488 0.473 0.508 0.463 0.511 0.497 0.482 0.520 0.469 0.525 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants, though not reported, 




Spatial Spillovers and Institutional Quality 
1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the institutional quality of a country affects its economic development 
(see Hall and Jones (1999), Sturm and De Haan (2001), Rodrick et al. (2004), and Seldadyo et al. 
(2007)).  While recent studies have highlighted the importance of institutions for economic growth, 
the mechanisms that shape these vital institutions are less understood.  Since institutions are 
important for the economic growth of a country, it is important to better understand how a country 
“chooses” its institutions and how they evolve over time.  Existing studies tend to focus on the 
factors within a country that may affect its institutional quality.  These studies do not allow for the 
possibility that neighboring countries are also influencing that country’s institutions.  If there are 
spillovers from neighboring institutions, understanding what type of institutions are being 
influenced by neighboring countries can further our understanding of institutions and their 
evolution.     
In this paper I employ spatial econometric techniques to analyze how the institutions in one 
country are related to the institutions in neighboring countries. I measure institutions using three 
different sets of indices: the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the Economic Freedom of 
the World (EFW) index and its area sub-indices, and the Freedom House political freedoms and 
civil rights indices. Employing spatial Durbin models, I estimate how institutional quality in one 
country is related to the institutional quality in neighboring countries over time using a panel of 
data on 18 to 28 countries that covers the years 1970-2009. Unlike most previous studies, I exploit 
time as well as cross-country variation to understand the evolution of institutional quality.   
A country’s institutions are likely affected by the economic, social, and political landscapes 
of their geographic neighbors. There is growing empirical evidence to support the idea of 
institutional spillovers across geographic neighbors. For example, de Groot (2011) analyzes how 
the expansion of political freedoms in neighboring countries in Africa leads to spillovers in the 
home country. Seldadyo et al. (2010) find that governance institutions are spatially correlated 
across a broader sample of countries. Also looking at a country’s level of governance, Kelejian, et 




country affect a home country’s level of institutional development. Furthermore, Simmons and 
Elkins (2004) report that countries tend to adopt, in particular, institutional improvements from 
their neighbors.
1
  These studies highlight the importance of institutional spillovers. Alternatively, 
Claeys and Manca (2011), find no evidence of institutional spillovers when using spatial 
techniques to examine the spillover effects of governance and economic freedom in a cross-section 
a countries.    
Since the level of institutions in a country will change over time, it is important to also look 
at the spillover effects of institutions across time. I contribute to the developing literature of 
institutional spillover effects using a SDM model estimated using maximum likelihood and using a 
panel data set.  Only Kelejian et al. (2013) have studied panel data and allowed for spatial 
dependence in their model.  However, in their study they examine institutional spillovers as 
measured by WGI and the Polity Index.  I expand on their work to include a larger number of 
institutional measures: WGI, EFW, and Freedom House indices. These measures cover a broad set 
of not only political but also economic institutions. I also concentrate only on a regional study, the 
EU, due to the ability of goods and labor to be easily traded in the EU.  Also, because I am 
concentrating on geographical neighbors having institutional spillovers, it makes sense to confine 
the study to one region.  Kelejian et al. look more broadly at institutional spillovers for all available 
countries.   
Examining additional institutional measures is important because is it is not clear that 
different institutions will have the same spatial dependence. In particular, spatial dependence may 
differ for economic versus political institutions. Furthermore, the substantially longer time period 
that I study allows for a better opportunity to observe the evolution of a country’s institutions in 
relation to those of its neighbors. 
In my study, I examine countries in the region of the European Union. Regional analysis is 
often best for spatial dependence studies since it studies geographical neighbors. Additionally, the 
European Union (EU) has fewer restrictions than other parts of the world on the movement of 
labor and goods within the European Union.  Since the flow of people and goods may be a channel 
                                                 
1 Though not straightforwardly a study of institutional spillovers, Bosker and Garretsen (2009) find that the institutional quality of a 




of the transmission of institutions and the European Union allows numerous countries to be 
studies, I concentrate on this region.  The time period I cover is from 1970 to 2009 and thus 
includes countries transitioning from command based to market based economies.  I believe many 
of the institutions adopted in these countries during this time period would still be affected by their 
geographic neighbors.  However, since this was a large institutional change for central and eastern 
European countries, I also allow for the possibility of time period fixed effects in my analysis.  
Theory suggests numerous reasons to think that countries’ institutional qualities will be 
geographically spatially dependent. First, and most straighforwardly, institutions that are easier to 
observe are more likely to be adopted (Leeson et al., 2012). The costs of observation are likely to 
be decreasing, all else equal, in geographic proximity. Furthermore, Simmons et al. (2006) discuss 
the diffusion of institutions and the importance of recognizing the interdependent nature of 
governments’ decision making processes. They highlight four channels of interdependence: 
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.   
Coercion may manifest in shaping institutions when other countries directly influence 
policy by manipulating opportunities. An example of this in the EU could be changes in monetary 
policy since the Euro Zone has certain monetary policies that must be followed.   Competition is 
more decentralized and is based on the idea that differential attractiveness of certain policies in the 
international market will cause countries to change their institutions. One way a country’s 
institutions may be affected by its neighbors is through international trade.  The trading of goods 
and services between countries allows for ideas, norms, and customs to be exchanged as well.  The 
introduction of new ideas will likely affect the institutions of both countries.  Additionally, trading 
between nations will be easier and will face lower transaction costs if countries have similar 
governing institutions for trade.  In this way, if one nation alters their rules or regulations for trade, 
a neighboring nation might also alter their rules and regulations.  Governments may also compete 
with each other for things like foreign direct investment (Quin and Roland (1998)).  Therefore the 
governments of neighboring countries need to be aware of both the institutional arrangements and 
changes of their neighboring countries and the institutional arrangements in their own country to 
compete for these flows.  In this sense, national governments may engage in policy changes in 




less competitive for foreign direct investment flows.  The fear of migration to neighboring 
countries will also induce governments to compete with each other.  For example, if a neighbor has 
recently become a more attractive place for employment, people may wish to migrate there for 
work.  However, the home country will not want to lose their tax base and so may alter their 
institutions in order to remain competitive with their neighbors.   
Learning as a diffusion mechanism arises from policy changes that are based on new 
information.  For example, governments learn from experiences in other countries and are likely to 
alter their behavior based on this (Berkowizt et al. (2003)).  Institutions that seem particularly 
successful in one country may be adopted in the neighboring country as citizens and governments 
notice the success of their neighbors (Simmons and Elkins (2004)).  Emulation is based on policy 
changes becoming socially accepted and then enacted.  This may happen when governments alter 
their institutions either because they see their neighbors doing well or in order to better facilitate 
the workings of regional economic organizations (Grilli (1997)).  It is difficult to distinguish 
between learning and emulation (Meseguer (2005)).  In this paper, I cannot distinguish between 
these two potential channels of diffusion.  Learning should demonstrate there was evidence of a 
policy’s efficacy before adoption.  Emulation of institutions can take place for both successful and 
unsuccessful institutions, however, more frequent emulation of successful instances occurs 
(Dobbin et al. (2007)).  
In this paper I report evidence that the institutions associated with economic freedom are 
spatially correlated.  The overall measure of economic freedom, EFW, and the components Money, 
Trade, and Regulation all have statistically significant spatially lagged dependent variables.  These 
institutions have spillover affects to their neighbors.  For the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
the institution measure Rule_Law also has a statistically significant spatially lagged dependent 
variable.  The institutions measured by Freedom House do not appear to be spatially correlated.    
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 and section 3 contain a description of my 
data and econometric model, respectively.  My results are presented and discussed in section 4 and 





Summary statistics for all data can be found in Table 22. As discussed above, there are multiple 
factors that may affect the spread of institutions.  Depending on the type of institution and how it is 
affected by these factors, spatial factors may be more or less important.  Because of this, I examine 
multiple kinds of institutions and their spatial dependence. I use the following as my proxies for 
institutions quality: (1) Worldwide Governance Indicators variables voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and rule of law; (2) the Economic Freedom of the World index from the 
Fraser Institute; (3) its five constituent area scores; and (4) the civil liberty and political freedom 
scores provided by Freedom House.  
My data set is a fully balanced panel data set.  There are 18 countries over six periods for 
this analysis.  All four regressions using the World Governance Indicators cover the time period 
1996-2009 in two year average data for 28 countries (1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-
2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, and 2008-2009).  All data for regressions using the Economic 
Freedom Index is from 1980-2009 and is done in five year average increments (1980-1984, 1985-
1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009).  There are seven periods covered for 
the World Governance Indicators.  Data from Freedom House is from 1970-2009 and is done in 
five-year averages for a total of eight periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009).     
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) measure six dimensions of governance: 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The data range from -2.5 to 2.5 with 2.5 
being used for institutions that have good governance.  I follow Kelejian et al. (2013) and study 
three of these dimensions: voice and accountability (Voice), government effectiveness 
(Effectiveness), and rule of law (Rule_Law). These three indicators best represent the political, 
administrative, and legal institutions discussed in economic development.   
The WGI is the institutional measure that has been employed most widely in studying 
institutional spillovers (Seldadyo et al. (2010), Claeys and Manca (2011), Kelejian et al. (2013)).  
Kelejian et al. (2013) is the only study that examines this measure using panel data.  However, the 




periods, such as two-year periods.  Therefore, I also examine other institutional measures to 
examine the question of institutional spillovers.            
The Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW) measures how supportive a country’s 
institutions are to economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2012). Therefore, it gauges a country’s 
economic institutions. The overall index is the sum of five constituent area scores: size of 
government (Size_Gov), access to sound money (Money), freedom to trade internationally (Trade), 
regulations of credit, labor, and business (Regulation), and legal structure and property rights 
(Prop_Rights). The comprehensive scores and area scores are all presented on a scale from zero to 
10, with zero being least and 10 being most free. 
Freedom House also provides political rights (Pol_Rights) and civil liberties (Civil_Lib) 
scores for countries. A country’s score for political rights is based on an evaluation of the 
characteristics of the electoral process, the functioning of the government, and political 
participation and pluralism. Civil liberties alternatively scores the extent to which the government 
is constrained. It is based on an evaluation of associational and organizational rights, freedom of 
belief and expression, personal autonomy, and the rule of law. Each score is on the scale of 1 to 7 
where 1 is the most free. These are the only institutional measures where a lower number is 
“better”. 
In selecting my control variables, I follow those commonly used in the literature to study 
institutional levels. My control variables have been extensively used in the literature to examine 
variables important in determining the level of institutions. La Porta et al. (1999) show that the 
origin of a country’s legal system has an impact on its institutional performance. In my model, I 
follow Seldadyo et al (2010) and capture legal origin by creating an index form 1 to 3.  Countries 
with socialist origins are given a 1, civil origins a 2, and common law traditions a 3.  Common law 
is generally thought to lead to better institutions today while a history of socialism is generally 
thought to harm current levels of institutions. These traditions reflect a country’s degree of state 
involvement.    
The culture within a country may also impact the level of institutions within it.  A country’s 
religion may serve as a proxy for important cultural variation.  I measure the proportion of the 




fractionalization may also impact institutional levels.  Having different ethnic groups can increase 
transaction costs in establishing effective institutional arrangements.  I employ the measure of 
ethnic fractionalization developed in Alesina et al. (2003) and measure fractionalization by the 
probability that two members of the population belong to the same ethnic group.  
A country’s institutions are also likely affected by its income level. I use the log of GDP 
per capita as a measure of income level.  A country’s population may also affect its institutional 
levels.  Public goods are cheaper with a higher population, but collective action problems also 
increase with a larger population. These variables come from the Penn World Tables 7.1.  How 
much a country trades may also affect both the level of institutions as well as serve as a 
transmission mechanism for how institutions may spillover.  My measure of openness also comes 
from the Penn World Tables 7.1.        
It is possible that there are omitted unobservable factors that vary over space.  Spatial 
dependence exists when there are unobservable geographical correlations.  For example, it may be 
that a neighbor’s institutions are affecting the home country’s institutions.  In this case, a 
dependent lag variable, a spatial lag of the institutional variable, would also need included.  The 
presence of a dependent lag variable is my variable of interest and the possibility of spatial 
variables needing to be included in the analysis is developed in the next section. 
3. Econometric Model 
Because it is likely that there is spatial dependence in the model, estimating the model using OLS 
will be misleading, either due to the errors having a downward bias or the model suffering from 
omitted variable bias.  Instead, a spatial econometric model must be estimated.   
I begin by looking at a general spatial econometric model represented by the following
2
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where i=1,…, N and is an index for the countries and t=1,…,T is an index for the time 
periods.     is an observation on the dependent variable, institution, at i and t,     is a (1,K) row 
                                                 




vector of observations on the explanatory variables, and   is a matching (K,1) vector of fixed, but 
unknown, parameters.     and    allow for the possibility of space-period and time-period fixed 
effects.  
 The additional terms allow for the possibility of a spatially lagged dependent variable, a 
spatial autoregressive process in the error term, or spatially weighted explanatory variables in the 
model.  The spatial weight matrix,   , establishes the geographical relationship among the 
countries in my sample.      is built using the ‘k-nearest-neighbors’ criterion and is determined 
using the latitude and longitude coordinates of the countries’ capital cities.  Latitude and longitude 
data comes from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).  I define a country’s neighbors to be the three 
countries with the closest capital city in my sample and the individual elements in the matrix     
equal “1” if observations i and j are neighbors and “0” otherwise.  The weight matrix is a row 
stochastic weight matrix, meaning the rows of the spatial weight matrix sum to 1.       is then 
considered a weighted average of the surrounding observations on the dependent variable,      is 
considered a weighted average of the surrounding observations on the independent variables, and 
     is considered a weighted average of the surrounding error terms.  This allows for the extent of 
the spatial autocorrelation to be measured.   
 Equation (1) allows for multiple special cases by restricting parameters.  These special 
cases allow for the spatial aspect to occur in a combination of the dependent variable, error term, 
and spatially lagged independent variables.  There are theoretical reasons to believe that the spatial 
dependence will occur in any of these cases, as discussed below.  
 For example, when     and    , the model is the spatial autoregressive (SAR) 
model.  In this case, the spatial dependence only occurs in the dependent variable.  This models 
when spatial spillovers happen directly through the institutions in the neighboring countries.  
Governance institutions or economic freedom from neighboring countries directly spillover and 
affect governance institutions or economic freedom in the home country.  This happens, for 
example, when one country alters its regulatory policy and the home country, after seeing the 
change, wishes to copy it.   
 When     and     are in effect, the model is the spatial error model (SEM) and 




the spatial effects are occurring through some unobserved avenue, such as civil war, YouTube, or 
shared membership in the U.N.  
 The spatial Durbin model (SDM) occurs when    .  In this case, the spatial dependence 
occurs through both the spatially lagged dependent variable and the spatially lagged independent 
variables.  Here, the spatial spillovers occur through both the neighbor’s institutions and its 
explanatory variables; for example, a neighbor’s per capita GDP affects the home country’s 
institutions by encouraging it to improve its institutions in order to compete for foreign direct 
investment.  
 As discussed in LeSage and Pace (2009), the SDM model should be used when it is 
believed that 1) there is an omitted variable that is spatially correlated and 2) this omitted spatially 
correlated variable is correlated with an included explanatory variable. Therefore, I use an SDM 
model for my initial spatial approach.    
 In my analysis, I concentrate only on countries that are in the European Union.  Because 
my weight matrix is a geographical nearest neighbor matrix, a regional analysis is best.  The 
European Union also allows for greater flows of labor and capital goods than other regions of the 
world.  Since the movement of people and goods may be an important transmission mechanism, I 
study an area where the flows of labor and capital are not as heavily restricted.  
4. Results 
Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25 present results from a standard pooled OLS model that does not 
take into account spatial dependence for institutional measures from the Economic Freedom Index, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Freedom House, respectively.     
Each column in the tables examines the effect of ethnic fractionalization, religion, legal 
origin, the natural log of per capita income, the natural log of population, and the natural log of 
trade openness on a different measure of institutions.   
 The OLS results appear to match what previous research has found.  Having a country 
with higher levels of Protestantism leads to more economic freedom, a better legal origin, greater 
levels of openness, and higher GDP per capita all lead to higher levels of economic freedom.  
Depending on what institution if being examined, these variables may or may not be significant, 




 However, these models do not take into account the possibility of spatial dependence.  
LeSage and Pace (2009) show that estimating OLS models could lead to biased, inconsistent, or 
inefficient results due to the possibility of spatial correlation.  The SDM model allows for spatial 
dependence in both the independent and dependent variables estimating the SDM model using 
maximum likelihood estimation will avoid the simultaneity bias in the spatially lagged dependent 
variable that is present in least-squares estimation.  It is important to remember that while the SDM 
model I estimate controls for the same independent variables as the OLS model as well as allows 
for spatial dependence, the results from the SDM model cannot be directly compared to the results 
of the OLS model.  Results from the SDM model consider both direct, indirect and total effects.  
The coefficient results from OLS models cannot be thought of as the same as the total effect 
results.         
 In estimating the SDM model, I first determine if a fixed time period effects model is 
necessary for each estimation.  To do this, I use a likelihood ratio test to assess the null hypothesis 
that H0 =  1,  2, . . . ,  t  = 0. The results of the likelihood ratio, it’s p-value and whether fixed time 
period effects are used are reported at the bottom of Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28.  One 
reason it is important to potentially include time period effects is due to dramatic changes in the 
political landscape of eastern and central Europe in the late 80s and early 90s.  While additional 
consideration of this may be warranted, time period effects will capture some of this variation.     
In my model, a country fixed effect model cannot be utilized.  This is because of the 
independent variables Ethnic, Legal_Origin, and Protestant.  These three control variables are all 
time invariant within my sample and thus already control for country fixed effects.  By including 
time invariant control variables the areas where country fixed effects manifest may be able to be 
seen.  This will help in understanding spillover transmission mechanisms and it will also allow me 
to compare institution spillovers to other determinants of institutional quality.      
 Table 26 reports the results for economic freedom and its components.  Spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable is present for EFW.    is equal to 0.320 and is significant 
at the 1 percent level.  This shows that in the case of EFW there are institutional spillover affects.  
As economic freedom increases in one country, on average, it increases by 0.320 units in 
surrounding areas.  The adjusted R
2




fixed effects are absorbing the variation.  Because of this possibility, I follow Elhorst (2010) and 
also report another goodness-of-fit measure that is based on the squared correlation coefficient 
between actual and fitted values.  This correlation is equal to 0.766.  In this case, 11.5 percent of 
the variation in EFW is explained by fixed effects.  While the spatial lag of the dependent variable 
is my variable of interest, it is also useful to interpret some control variables.   
 For economic freedom, EFW, the indirect effects for Ethnic, Protestant, lnGDP_pc, lnPop 
are all statistically significant.  For example, as Protestanism increases in a country by 10 percent, 
institutional quality in adjacent countries increases by 1.4 percent.  As per capita GDP increases by 
10 percent, institutional quality decreases in adjacent countries by 21.78 percent.  The negative 
effect on neighbor’s institutions may be because of some businesses or foreign direct investment 
are moving to the neighboring countries and governments are trying to compete quickly through 
institutional change.   
Spatial autocorrelation is also present for the economic freedom components Money, 
Trade, and Regulation. Size_Gov and Prop_Rights do not appear to have spatial autocorrelation.  
Money, Trade, and Regulation each have a positive and statistically significant spatially lagged 
dependent variable.    is equal to 0.416, 0.432, and 0.276, respectively at the one percent level.  
For example, as Money increases in one country, on average it increases by 0.416 in the 
surrounding countries.    
Per capita GDP continues to have a negative indirect effect for these institutions.  It appears 
that as a country increases its own GDP per capita, institutional quality in neighboring countries 
decreases.  This may be because of businesses moving, foreign direct investment, migration of 
productive workers, better trading with other countries or other reasons.  The total effect of per 
capita GDP is negative.  An increase in GDP decreases the institutional quality.  This result seems 
to be largely influenced by the indirect effects.     
 In Table 27, the results for the institutional measures of Voice, Effectiveness, and 
Rule_Law are reported.  Voice shows spatial autocorrelation (   -0.193) but only at the ten 
percent level.  Voice and accountability, participating in selecting government, freedom of 
expression, association, and media, seem to be negatively impacted by neighboring institutions. 
Voice has time period effects included in the regression and an adjusted R
2 




correlation coefficient of 0.849.  Effectiveness does not appear to have spatial autocorrelation.  
Rule_Law, however, is positive and significant at the one percent level (   0.321).  Citizens’ 
confidence in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police and courts does appear to 
have spillover affects.  The adjusted R
2
 for Rule_Law is 0.852 and the correlation coefficient is 
0.840.   
 Kelejian et al. (2013) use an SDM model only as a robustness check and do not report 
direct, indirect, and total effects.  This makes a direct comparison of my results to theirs 
impossible. However, the spatial lag of Voice is positive but insignificant whereas mine is negative 
and significant but only at the 10 percent level.  They find the spatial lag for Effectiveness 
significant where I do not and we both find Rule_Law positive and significant.  The discrepancies 
between the two results likely results from the different countries studied in the sample.       
 As shown in Table 28, neither Civil_Lib nor Pol_Rights appear to have spatial 
dependence.  This may be because either an OLS or spatial lag of X (SLX) model is the 
appropriate model.  
 It appears that political institutions have show less spatial dependence than economic 
institutions.  EFW, the components of economic freedom Money, Trade, and Regulation and the 
WGI measure Rule_Law all have spatial autocorrelations.  These institutions showing lagged 
spatial autocorrelations supports the transmission mechanisms discussed by Simmons et al. (2006).  
All of these institutions are broadly easy to observe.  Because they are easy to observe, institutions 
may be spreading through Learning or through Emulation. If a particular country successfully 
alters their trade law or makes small changes to their rule of law, neighbors might see the changes 
to the institutions and then alter their own institutions after seeing its success.  Similarly, the 
institutions that show spatial autocorrelations could be transmitting institutions because of 
competition between countries.  For example, if a particular country changes its trade law or 
regulations, neighbors may also change their institutions in order to remain competitive in foreign 
direct investment or labor markets. 
5. Conclusion  
The institutional quality of a country affects the country’s potential for economic development.  




a country’s institutional quality is the quality of its neighbors’ institutions.  For example, the trade 
policy in neighboring countries may directly affect the trade policy in the home country.  
In this paper, I employ spatial econometric techniques to analyze how levels of institutions 
in one country are affected by the level of institutions in neighboring countries using a panel data 
framework in the European Union.  Institutional quality in one country is likely affected by the 
economic environment and institutional quality in neighboring countries. I find that the Economic 
Freedom of the World measure of institutions shows positive institutional spillovers as well as the 
components that measure access to sound money, the freedom to trade internationally, and the 
regulations of credit, labor and business.  For these measures of institutions, a country’s institutions 
directly affect the institutional quality of the neighboring countries’ institutions.  The Worldwide 
Governance Indicator rule of law also shows positive institutional spillovers and the institutions 
measured by Freedom House do not appear to have spatial spillovers.  It appears that economic 
institutions show more spatial dependence than political institutions.
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Table 22. Descriptive Statistics 






   
 
 
N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev 
EFW 18 6.959 0.889    
   
Size_Gov 18 4.401 1.116    
   
Money 18 8.497 1.412    
   
Trade 18 7.907 1.409    
   
Regulation 18 6.370 1.055    
   
Prop_Rights 15 7.841 1.011    
   
 
      
   
Voice    
27 1.137 0.371    
Effectiveness    
27 1.173 0.689    
Rule_Law    
27 1.077 0.651    
 
      
   
Civil_Lib       
20 2.000 1.553 
Pol_Rights       
20 1.805 1.708 
 
      
   
Ethnic 18 0.173 0.153 27 0.229 0.168 20 0.188 0.157 
Protestant 18 22.089 32.061 27 18.422 29.044 20 17.875 30.616 
Legal_Origin 18 2.111 0.460 27 1.741 0.645 20 1.950 0.591 
LnOpenness 18 4.227 0.596 27 4.513 0.443 20 4.090 0.674 
LnGDPpc 18 10.064 0.384 27 9.972 0.538 20 9.773 0.582 
LnPop 18 15.988 1.583 27 15.889 1.424 20 15.972 1.476 
1 
5 year averages from 1980-2009 
2 
2 year averages from 1996-2009 
3 






Table 23. OLS Regressions, EFW 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES EFW Size_Gov Money Trade Regulation Prop_Rights 
              
Ethnic 0.094 -0.231 -0.294 1.689** 0.222 -0.775 
 
(0.481) (1.442) (0.538) (0.671) (0.849) (0.662) 
Protestant 0.006** -0.009 0.005 0.009** 0.015*** 0.011** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Legal_Origin 0.624*** 1.089*** 0.074 0.788** 0.929** 0.189 
 
(0.097) (0.241) (0.199) (0.345) (0.391) (0.206) 
LnOpenness 0.932*** 0.740 1.385*** 1.042** 0.940** 0.555 
 
(0.228) (0.463) (0.277) (0.477) (0.443) (0.362) 
LnGDPpc 0.985*** -0.391 1.692*** 1.309*** 0.579 1.595** 
 
(0.240) (0.549) (0.355) (0.255) (0.472) (0.558) 
LnPop 0.288*** 0.119 0.469*** 0.524*** 0.204 0.116 
 
(0.066) (0.162) (0.087) (0.143) (0.167) (0.095) 
       Observations 108 108 108 108 108 90 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 15 
Adj R
2
 0.750 0.356 0.623 0.607 0.573 0.485 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Constants, though not reported, are included in all regressions.  
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Table 24. OLS Regressions, WGI data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voice Effectiveness Rule_Law 
        
Ethnic -0.317 0.031 -0.500* 
 
(0.193) (0.263) (0.266) 
Protestant 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Legal_Origin 0.076 0.256*** 0.152* 
 
(0.056) (0.072) (0.080) 
LnOpenness 0.072 0.066 -0.022 
 
(0.111) (0.170) (0.159) 
LnGDPpc 0.426*** 0.790*** 0.816*** 
 
(0.051) (0.133) (0.106) 
LnPop 0.006 0.009 -0.039 
 
(0.030) (0.037) (0.039) 
    Observations 189 189 189 
Countries 28 28 28 
Adj R
2
 0.770 0.833 0.850 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Constants, though not reported, are included in all regressions.  




Table 25. OLS Regressions, Freedom House data 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Civil_Lib Pol_Rights 
      
Ethnic 1.566** 1.972** 
 
(0.701) (0.742) 
Protestant -0.004 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Legal_Origin -0.668*** -0.872*** 
 
(0.164) (0.224) 
LnOpenness -0.672 -0.57* 
 
(0.415) (0.493) 
LnGDPpc -1.302*** -1.254*** 
 
(0.376) (0.354) 
LnPop -0.102 -0.207 
 
(0.147) (0.172) 
   Observations 160 160 
Countries 20 20 
Adj R
2
 0.600 0.556 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Constants, though not reported, are included in all regressions.  
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Table 26. Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) results for EFW data 
Dependent Variable EFW Size_Gov Money Trade Regulation Prop_Rights 
        Ethnic Direct 1.057 ** 2.620 *** 0.313  1.004  0.100  0.070  
  (0.252, 2.033) (1.424, 3.876) (-1.051, 1.792) (-0.142, 2.217) (-0.827, 1.091) (-1.438, 1.534) 
 Indirect 4.430 ** 4.065 ** 2.066  2.193  3.512 *** 7.869 ** 
  (1.696, 7.985) (0.451, 8.039) (-1.095, 5.032) (-0.826, 4.794) (1.838, 5.314) (2.400, 13.582) 
 Total 5.487 ** 6.684 *** 2.379  3.198 * 3.612 *** 7.940 ** 
  (1.970, 10.131) (2.276, 11.473) (-1.467, 6.202) (-0.230, 6.277) (1.507, 5.856) (1.288, 14.951) 
Protestant Direct 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.006  0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.016 *** 
  (0.006, 0.013) (0.005, 0.017) (-0.002, 0.014) (0.01, 0.024) (0.008, 0.020) (0.01, 0.021) 
 Indirect 0.014 ** -0.021 ** 0.025 * 0.024 * 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 
  (0.002, 0.028) (-0.037, -0.004) (-0.002, 0.052) (0.002, 0.048) (0.026, 0.060) (0.018, 0.064) 
 Total 0.024 *** -0.010  0.030 ** 0.041 *** 0.055 *** 0.056 *** 
  (0.011, 0.038) (-0.024, 0.006) (0.004, 0.055) (0.019, 0.065) (0.041, 0.075) (0.033, 0.081) 
Legal_Origin Direct 0.503 *** 0.776 *** -0.010  0.851 *** 0.768 *** -0.139  
  (0.338, 0.666) (0.486, 1.043) (-0.468, 0.427) (0.442, 1.307) (0.486, 1.046) (-0.591, 0.288) 
 Indirect 0.004  -0.248  -0.079  3.214 *** 0.610  0.661  
  (-0.653, 0.618) (-1.137, 0.580) (-1.961, 1.534) (1.582, 5.207) (-0.407, 1.623) (-0.832, 2.168) 
 Total 0.507  0.528  -0.089  4.065 *** 1.377 ** 0.522  
  (-0.244, 1.181) (-0.498, 1.437) (-2.257, 1.746) (2.151, 6.429) (0.207, 2.508) (-0.863, 1.925) 
LnOpenness Direct 0.550 ** 0.011  1.429 *** 2.636 *** 1.072 *** 0.866 * 
  (0.181, 0.940) (-0.610, 0.616) (0.501, 2.311) (1.822, 3.459) (0.492, 1.602) (0.038, 1.661) 
 Indirect 0.499  0.589  2.082 * 2.061 ** 2.557 *** 0.526  
  (-0.549, 1.531) (-0.889, 2.049) (0.129, 4.090) (0.387, 4.157) (1.442, 3.897) (-1.410, 2.363) 
 Total 1.048  0.600  3.511 ** 4.697 *** 3.629 *** 1.392  
  (-0.167, 2.284) (-0.979, 2.212) (1.105, 5.891) (2.629, 7.200) (2.326, 5.217) (-0.816, 3.659) 
LnGDPpc Direct 0.260  -1.205 *** 0.610  0.659 * -0.732 *** -0.389  
  (-0.208, 0.636) (-1.840, -0.611) (-0.186, 1.371) (0.001, 1.281) (-1.216, -0.287) (-1.239, 0.455) 
 Indirect -2.178 *** -2.738 *** -2.710 ** -5.716 *** -3.602 *** -2.787 ** 
  (-3.809, -0.881) (-4.649, -0.965) (-5.020, -0.208) (-8.230, -3.691) (-5.407, -2.294) (-4.914, -0.909) 
 Total -1.919 ** -3.943 *** -2.100  -5.057 *** -4.334 *** -3.176 ** 
  (-3.950, -0.354) (-6.327, -1.864) (-4.908, 0.663) (-7.850, -2.693) (-6.357, -2.835) (-5.506, -1.098) 
LnPop Direct 0.258 *** -0.041  0.466 ** 0.994 *** 0.350 *** 0.291 ** 
  (0.125, 0.398) (-0.248, 0.173) (0.132, 0.789) (0.708, 1.287) (0.143, 0.552) (0.049, 0.516) 
 Indirect 0.556 *** 0.376  0.393  0.848 ** 1.506 *** 0.818 ** 
  (0.217, 0.954) (-0.045, 0.847) (-0.511, 1.263) (0.110, 1.653) (1.014, 2.185) (0.271, 1.443) 





(0.380, 1.297) (-0.177, 0.915) (-0.301, 1.946) (0.900, 2.812) (1.266, 2.646) (0.498, 1.821) 
 
       
                                  0.320*** 0.099 0.416*** 0.432*** 0.276*** -0.088 
t-stat   3.157 0.936 4.554 4.953 2.734 -0.730 
p-value  0.002 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.465 
Time Effects  Y Y N N N Y 
LR  18.905 22.607 9.618 9.060 7.225 27.657 
p-value  0.004 0.009 0.142 0.170 0.301 0.000 
Adj R2  0.881 0.758 0.661 0.748 0.730 0.786 
Corr2   0.766 0.698 0.602 0.691 0.695 0.711 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals for the effects 
estimates are underneath the estimates within parentheses. 
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Table 27. Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) results for Kaufmann data 
Dependent Variable Voice Effectiveness Rule_Law 
     
Ethnic Direct -0.810 *** 0.079  -0.394  
  (-1.079, -0.563) (-0.326, 0.480) (-0.868, 0.152) 
 Indirect 0.502 ** 2.428 *** 2.832 *** 
  (0.037, 0.957) (1.549, 3.410) (1.621, 4.244) 
 Total -0.308  2.506 *** 2.438 ** 
  (-0.959, 0.301) (1.372, 3.776) (0.726, 4.308) 
Protestant Direct 0.000  0.005 *** 0.004 *** 
  (-0.002, 0.002) (0.003, 0.007) (0.002, 0.007) 
 Indirect 0.007 *** 0.002  -0.001  
  (0.004, 0.010) (-0.003, 0.006) (-0.007, 0.005) 
 Total 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.003  
  (0.005, 0.008) (0.004, 0.009) (-0.002, 0.008) 
Legal_Origin Direct -0.086 ** 0.117 ** 0.027  
  (-0.151, -0.022) (0.011, 0.217) (-0.078, 0.135) 
 Indirect 0.168 ** -0.776 *** 0.088  
  (0.010, 0.324) (-1.084, -0.532) (-0.249, 0.413) 
 Total 0.083  -0.659 *** 0.115  
  (-0.073, 0.228) (-0.983, -0.393) (-0.245, 0.466) 
LnOpenness Direct 0.158 *** -0.108  -0.181 * 
  (0.052, 0.265) (-0.270, 0.051) (-0.370, 0.012) 
 Indirect -0.180  -0.826 *** -1.147 *** 
  (-0.407, 0.050) (-1.265, -0.456) (-1.691, -0.624) 
 Total -0.022  -0.934 *** -1.328 *** 
  (-0.267, 0.211) (-1.428, -0.520) (-1.949, -0.742) 
LnGDPpc Direct 0.519 *** 0.917 *** 0.850 *** 
  (0.439, 0.598) (0.799, 1.030) (0.734, 0.971) 
 Indirect -0.095  0.772 *** 0.177  
  (-0.250, 0.053) (0.520, 1.059) (-0.212, 0.574) 
 Total 0.424 *** 1.689 *** 1.027 *** 
  (0.270, 0.584) (1.411, 2.008) (0.577, 1.449) 
LnPop Direct 0.050 *** 0.018  -0.086 *** 
  (0.018, 0.081) (-0.029, 0.064) (-0.139, -0.030) 
 Indirect 0.038  0.140 *** -0.166 *** 
  (-0.007, 0.086) (0.056, 0.228) (-0.260, -0.070) 





(0.042, 0.139) (0.066, 0.254) (-0.359, -0.140) 
                                  
 
-0.193* 0.005 0.321*** 
t-stat  
 
-1.964 0.055 4.334 
p-value 
 
0.050 0.956 0.000 
Time Effects 
 
Y Y N 
LR 
 
15.475 20.98 2.856 
p-value 
 





0.856 0.909 0.852 
Corr
2
   0.849 0.909 0.840 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Lower and upper 95% confidence 









Ethnic Direct 1.847 *** 2.311 *** 
  (0.577, 2.983) (1.031, 3.486) 
 Indirect 5.132 ** 5.803 ** 
  (1.696, 8.929) (1.938, 10.097) 
 Total 6.979 *** 8.114 *** 
  (2.784, 11.495) (3.612, 13.254) 
Protestant Direct -0.001  -0.001  
  (-0.008, 0.006) (-0.009, 0.007) 
 Indirect 0.005  0.001  
  (-0.018, 0.027) (-0.024, 0.026) 
 Total 0.004  0.000  
  (-0.020, 0.026) (-0.025, 0.024) 
Legal_Origin Direct -0.879 *** -1.113 *** 
  (-1.219, -0.534) (-1.478, -0.750) 
 Indirect -1.160 * -2.334 *** 
  (-2.522, 0.107) (-3.978, -0.982) 
 Total -2.039 *** -3.447 *** 
  (-3.500, -0.690) (-5.082, -1.963) 
LnOpenness Direct -0.573 * -1.152 *** 
  (-1.137, -0.040) (-1.724, -0.598) 
 Indirect -0.624  -1.392 ** 
  (-1.763, 0.443) (-2.661, -0.248) 
 Total -1.197  -2.543 *** 
  (-2.702, 0.192) (-4.116, -1.060) 
LnGDPpc Direct -0.764 *** -0.740 *** 
  (-1.163, -0.364) (-1.169, -0.302) 
 Indirect 0.297  1.772 ** 
  (-1.204, 1.989) (0.104, 3.443) 
 Total -0.467  1.032  
  (-2.180, 1.356) (-0.784, 2.893) 
LnPop Direct 0.157  -0.106  
  (-0.064, 0.370) (-0.339, 0.114) 
 Indirect 0.691 *** 0.518 ** 
  (0.235, 1.136) (0.025, 0.993) 





(0.232, 1.418) (-0.229, 1.042) 





















Corr2   0.626 0.620 
Note: *, **, *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals for 
























































































































































































In my first essay, “Foreign Aid, Institutional Quality, and Growth”, Dr. Andrew Young and I 
examined how foreign aid affects economic and political institutions. We found that aid flows were 
associated with the deterioration of both political and economic institutions. Aid flows are 
associated with deterioration in a recipient’s legal system and property rights, all well as its 
openness to international trade. We then examined how this affected economic growth in recipient 
countries.  After controlling for institutional quality, aid flows were not otherwise significantly 
related to growth, however, aid flows did potentially harm growth outcomes through harming the 
economic institutions that are important for countries’ growth and development.  Finding that 
foreign aid flows harm institutional quality and thus indirectly economic growth is particularly 
troubling since aid flows are often meant to help recipient countries improve their institutions and 
their potential for long term growth.  Future research examining how aid flows are altering 
economic and political institutions should be done.  Additionally, examining other flows, such as 
foreign direct investment and remittances, may help in better understanding aid flows and their 
impact on recipient countries.      
In my second essay, I examined how globalization impacted culture. While many believe 
that globalization leads to cultural change within a society, how globalization impacts culture is 
still an active research area.  In this paper I empirically investigated how globalization affected 
culture where culture was defined as the dimensions that are important for entrepreneurship and 
economic growth. I found that globalization is positively related to this measure of culture.  
Additional globalization can move a culture towards one more conducive to growth and 
development.  Furthermore, it was the economic and social (rather than the political) dimensions of 
globalization that appeared to drive the estimated relationship.  Informal institutions such as culture 
are vital to the functioning of formal institutions and thus important to the growth and development 
in countries.  However, informal institutions are persistent and slow to change.  Better 
understanding what can cause informal institutions to change over time is important to better 
understand the functioning of formal institutions.  Empirically measuring and studying culture is 




allows for an empirical study across time and countries, additional research examining how 
globalization affects culture using alternative measures of culture would be useful.        
My final essay examined if there were institutional spillover effects from one country to 
another.  I examined the possibility of institutional spillovers in countries in the European Union 
by employing a Spatial Durbin maximum likelihood model since institutional quality in one 
country is likely affected by the economic environment and institutional quality in neighboring 
countries. I found that there are spillover effects for both economic and political institutions.  It 
appears that policies and institutions diffuse over country borders.  Future research should be 
aware that neighboring policies, environment, and institutions may affect a country’s own 
institutional quality when studying institutional change.      
Institutional quality appears to be an essential ingredient for economic growth.  My three 
essays all add to a better understanding of the different elements that cause institutional change.  
The study of institutional quality and institutional change remains an important area of research 
and discussion because of its importance for economic development and this dissertation offers a 
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